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Abstract 
The Effects of the Confirmation Bias on Diagnostic Decision Making 
Meagan Carleton Parmley, Ph.D. 
Supervisor: James D. Herbert, Ph.D.  
 
 
 Research has shown that the confirmation bias affects judgments in a wide array 
of contexts, including clinical settings.  Studies have demonstrated that the confirmation 
bias not only affects one’s hypothesis testing strategy, but also how one interacts with 
others and how others in turn respond.  In addition, several studies investigating the 
effects of diagnostic labels have found that such labels affect the way in which clinicians 
interpret information.  Thus, once clinicians make a diagnosis, the confirmation bias has 
the potential to color their subsequent processing of new data, resulting in confirmation 
of initial diagnostic impressions even if these impressions are contradicted by subsequent 
data.  In an attempt to mitigate the effects of the confirmation bias, several studies have 
investigated various debiasing techniques, including warning or educating subjects about 
biases.  The results of these studies indicate that such techniques may be useful if subjects 
are adequately educated about a bias.  The purpose of this study was to examine the 
possible effects of the confirmation bias in psychodiagnostic assessment, and to examine 
the effectiveness of educating clinicians specifically about the confirmation bias.  
Clinicians received two case vignettes, followed by additional information about each 
case one week later.  The additional information was either consistent with the diagnosis 
indicated by the initial data, or inconsistent with it.  Participants were asked to make a 
diagnosis after reading each vignette.  Half of the participants received information about 
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the confirmation bias at time two before receiving additional information about the cases.  
Results suggest that clinicians did evidence the confirmation bias during performance of 
this task.  Specifically, clinicians tended to remain consistent with their original diagnosis 
when a change in diagnosis was required from time one to time two.  In addition, the 
confirmation bias instructions did not have a significant effect on participants’ 
performance during this task.  Participants did not overcorrect, or incorrectly alter their 
initial diagnoses, when they received confirmation bias instructions.  Finally, age was a 
predictor of diagnostic accuracy; specifically, as age increased, performance decreased.  
There was also some evidence to suggest that those participants who identified their 
orientation as cognitive behavioral performed more accurately.  The results hold 
important implications about commonly occurring biases in the psychodiagnostic 
assessment process. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Records of mental illness extend as far back as the earliest historical records.  
However, psychiatric diagnosis is a much more recent phenomenon, reflecting the 
conceptualization of psychology within a medical framework. One of the earliest 
conceptualizations of mental illness was known as demonology, or the notion that the 
devil resides within a person’s body and controls their mind.  The early Chinese, 
Egyptians, Babylonians and Greeks believed in demonology and regularly performed 
exorcisms in an attempt to cast the evil spirits from the afflicted body.  In addition, 
extreme measures were taken at times to make the body uninhabitable to the spirits, 
including measures such as starvation or even beatings (Zilboorg & Henry, 1941). 
Hippocrates (460 to 377 BC) was among the first to regard this bizarre behavior 
as an illness, which he likened to the common cold.  He believed in the notion that 
something wrong with the soma, or body, interrupts thought and behavior.  This idea is 
also known as somatogenesis.  Therefore, mental illness was seen as a disease of the 
brain resulting in abnormal behaviors.  He classified mental disorders into six categories 
(a) epilepsy, (b) mania (states of abnormal excitement), (c) melancholia (states of 
abnormal depression), (d) paranoia (an illness today that we would term mental 
retardation), (e) hysteria, and (f) phrenitis, also known as brain fever (Davison 1998; 
Zilboorg, 1941).  He believed that a balance in the four humors (fluids of the body) 
blood, black bile, yellow bile, and phlegm was responsible for normal brain functioning 
and mental health.  Any imbalance in these humors was thought to result in a mental 
disorder (Zilboorg, 1941).  These early attempts at the psychodiagnostic process suggest 
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that categorizing mental disorders was an important first step in the treatment of these 
illnesses.  
Although Hippocrates’ ideas obviously did not hold up to later discoveries, the 
Greeks and Romans largely accepted them over the next seven centuries.  Hippocrates’ 
conceptualization of mental illness as stemming from a problem within the body was a 
very new and unique approach, especially compared to approaches like demonology 
where the problem was conceptualized as an uninvited spirit temporarily inhabiting the 
body.  Although his theory of humors was not accurate, his conceptualization of mental 
illness as physical rather than supernatural was a significant step in understanding mental 
illness.  Although his classification system was rudimentary by today’s standards and 
involved only six diagnostic categories and four etiological sources (four humors), it did 
represent the phenomenon of psychodiagnostic classification even as early as the Greco-
Roman period.  
Following the demise of the Roman Empire, the church became the primary 
institution through which the mentally ill were treated.  Physicians such as Galen (A.D. 
130-200) of the Roman Empire were among the last physicians of the classical era 
(Zilboorg, 1941).  A clear shift had occurred from a somatic conceptualization of mental 
illness toward more spiritual, supernatural explanations, representing a step backward, 
away from the naturalistic account of Hippocrates.  This shift was a reflection of the 
influence of the church on all aspects of life during this time.  As the influence of the 
church continued to grow, monasteries became the primary location for the treatment of 
the mentally ill.  The early Christian authorities were often puzzled and frightened by the 
very idea of mental illness, as most disorders were thought to be the work of the devil 
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(Zilboorg, 1941).  Monks would often pray over the mentally ill and have the patients 
drink potions during certain phases of the lunar cycle in an attempt to heal them 
(Davison, 1998).  Clearly, Hippocrates’ and Galen’s humoral classification went into 
decline during this time, although it did not disappear completely.  In actuality, their 
classification system began to coexist with the demonological paradigm (Schoeneman, 
1977).  
 Beginning in the thirteenth century, people turned to witchcraft to explain the 
famines and plagues that killed a large number of the population.  Because the church had 
such a great influence on all aspects of people’s lives, the population turned to religion to 
explain the deaths of so many.  Because death on such a massive scale could not be 
considered to be an act of God, people turned to the devil and believed the devil 
represented the foundation for witchcraft.  Large hunts were made in search of these 
“witches” in an attempt to explain and understand what was inexplicable to them at the 
time.  Although there was little logic to this idea, those who were accused of witchcraft 
and did not confess were tortured. Those who confessed and wanted to repent were sent 
to prison for life and those who were convicted and not willing to repent were executed.  
Although most of the accused were likely not mentally ill, some of the accused were 
targeted because they had allegedly made bizarre statements suggesting that they had 
seen or had intercourse with the devil.  Today, professionals would likely consider 
someone like this to be suffering from hallucinations or delusions, and therefore some of 
these men and women known as “witches” are thought rather to have been psychotic 
(Zilboorg & Henry, 1941).  Obviously, those who were tortured were likely confessing to 
accusations that were not true in order to alleviate at least some of their suffering.  
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Interestingly, torture was not allowed in England, and very few confessions there 
included psychotic-like symptoms (Schoeneman, 1977). 
Early conceptualization and classification of mental illness   
The Malleus Maleficarum, written by Henry Kramer and James Sprenger, was 
developed as a guide to seek out these “witches” (Anderson, 1970).  This guide was 
known as the huntsman’s bible and described witches as “dissenters, schismatics and the 
mentally ill” (Schoeneman, 1977).  There were two categories of women who were 
targeted throughout most of the witch hunts.  The first was a melancholy group who were 
described as being in a depressed state.  Other characteristics of this group included 
making statements that were obscure or threatening and any displays of odd behavior in 
general.  The second category included women who had isolated themselves from the 
community (Schoeneman, 1977).  Based on the information from these two categories, 
the descriptions potentially define a large percentage of women.  Although they offered 
criteria to define what ‘melancholy’ means, these criteria were extremely vague and 
anyone working from these categories would likely be able to find these characteristics in 
a large part of the population.    
In some of the witch hunts such as the Salem Witch Trials, some of the witches fit 
the stereotype of a “hag” or an older woman who was considered to be ugly or frightful, 
however of those who were killed, fourteen were women, six were men, and although 
some were very critical of the trials, others were merely disliked by the community 
(Schoeneman, 1977).  Again, within this sample, it does not appear that there was any 
type of carefully considered classification system in place.  At times it may have been 
that those individuals who the community feared, or those who spoke out against the 
                                                                                                             Effects of the Confirmation Bias          5
witch hunts, were among the accused.  Again, these criteria defining “witches” were so 
broad that they included the mentally ill, anyone who did not believe in God and anyone 
displaying the least bit of bizarre behavior. 
The Malleus Maleficarum listed two categories of etiological factors.  The first 
was a supernatural intervention (“by the power of devils, with God’s permission”) and a 
natural defect (“as it is shown in the case of frantics and melancholy men, and in maniacs 
and some drunkards”) (Sprenger and Kramer, 1928, as cited in Zilboorg, 1941).  This 
again, provides some evidence that accused ‘witches’ may have been anyone who did not 
follow the social rules of the community.   
Finally, although there was little in the way of an official classification system, 
and the etiology was usually assumed to be the work of the devil, there were six 
categories identified with respect to how the devil injured humanity.  Zilboorg (1941) 
describes these: 
One is, to induce an evil love in a man for a woman, or in a woman for a man.  
The second is to plant hatred or jealousy in anyone.  The third is to bewitch them 
so that a man cannot perform the genital act with a woman, or conversely a 
woman with a man; or by various means to procure an abortion…The fourth is to 
cause some disease in any of the human organs. The fifth, to take away life.  The 
sixth, to deprive them of reason. (p. 158) 
Although there were some attempts at classification during the witch hunts, a major 
problem was the attempting to give explanations to events that were at the time 
unexplainable.  The Malleus Malleficarum was based mostly on an emotional reaction of 
fear rather than an attempt to study the phenomenon from a scientific standpoint.  
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Anyone acting outside of the realm of normalcy at the time or anyone questioning the 
beliefs of the community was suspected of being a witch.   
Clearly, these developments represented a great decline in the naturalistic 
approach to mental illness from the work of Hippocrates and Galen.  However, this 
example again demonstrates and early desire for psychodiagnostic classification despite 
the unscientific nature of these classifications.        
These examples also illustrate how biases played a vital role in determining who 
would be among those accused of being witches.  Based on the criteria discussed above, 
if someone were somewhat depressed or otherwise mentally ill, did not believe in God, 
drank alcohol, had a disheveled appearance, or was simply somewhat isolated from the 
rest of the community, they risked being accused of being a witch.  Clearly, the 
confirmation bias played a role in the mass killings of these men and women.  One 
obvious example of this was the dunking and often subsequent drowning of witches in 
lakes.  The belief was that if accused witches were dropped into a lake as they were tied 
to a chair and they sank, they drowned and were apparently guilty.  Otherwise, the logic 
was that they would not have drowned.  However, if they did float for a period of time, 
this was also a sure sign that they were guilty.  Both outcomes were used to confirm their 
initial impression, and there was no opportunity for disconfirmatory evidence to be 
recognized.  
 By the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, possession came to be viewed as an 
important etiological factor in insanity and supernatural explanations became prominent 
during the witch hunts of the 16th and 17th century (Schoeneman, 1977).  However, 
supernatural explanations were not the only conceptualizations of mental illness from the 
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1200s to the 1600s.  Many Europeans were kept in hospitals and stayed for the duration 
of their illness.  Those who were considered incompetent as well as insane were 
hospitalized.  Although there were very few mental hospitals in Europe in the 13th and 
14th centuries, there were hundreds of hospitals for those with leprosy.  At the end of the 
Crusades, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, leprosy diminished, and the focus 
turned to the mentally ill.  Many of the hospitals used for leprosy were turned into 
asylums for the mentally impaired.  The main goal for patients confined in these asylums 
was to get them to work.  During the same time period, however, hospitals emerged that 
focused on the confinement of the mentally ill in an attempt to isolate them from the rest 
of the community.  One hospital became more specifically geared toward the 
confinement of the mentally ill in London, known as the Priority of St. Mary of 
Bethlehem (Davison, 1988; Zilboorg, 1941).  The conditions were extremely poor in this 
hospital and soon after it opened, it became known as “Bedlam,” describing the 
confusing and chaotic environment within the hospital.  Tickets were even sold for 
tourists to view the confusion in this hospital as late as the 19th century.    
During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Rosen (1968) noted that medical 
professionals usually assumed that illnesses had a natural cause.  However, if the illness 
was bizarre or they had no experience treating it, they may accept a supernatural 
explanation.  However, Rosen (1968) also noted that not all physicians were inclined to 
accept the possibility of possession and some denied it outright.  Kroll (1973) cites the 
Encyclopedia of Barthoemaeus in which mental disorders were dealt with in a non-
demonological manner.  It was first written in the 13th century and was widely read in the 
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days of the witch hunts.  This illustrates the gradual shift toward naturalistic explanations 
of mental illness is the waning days of the late Medieval period.   
Schoeneman also cites Paracelsus, a major Renaissance figure who contributed to 
the fields of medicine, chemistry and pharmacy.  Although it is not clear whether he 
obtained a medical degree, he was known to practice medicine and to give medical 
advice.  Paracelsus wrote in the early sixteenth century about the five categories of 
permanently insane people.  These included (a) Lunatici (Disturbed by the moon), (b) 
Insani (generally insane), (c) Vesani (poisoned or contaminated by food or drink), (d) 
Melancholici (insane by their nature) and (e) Obsessi (referring to those who are 
possessed by the devil).  Although his classification system was rudimentary, he clearly 
believed in both a supernatural as well as a natural account of mental illness.  As is clear 
from the five categories listed above, many of the explanations for mental illness 
included supernatural explanations during the 13th through the 16th centuries.  Again, due 
to the rudimentary nature of this classification system, one can imagine the biases taking 
place during this psychodiagnostic process.  Specifically, there may have been evidence 
to suggest that none of these hypotheses were accurate; however, information was 
interpreted to fit one of these categories.   
From the fifteenth to the start of the seventeenth century, mental illness was 
largely conceptualized as a supernatural phenomenon, although some still believed in a 
naturalistic explanation.  Examples include the descriptions of witches and their 
relationship with the devil as well as a few of the categories cited by Paracelsus 
including, Lunatici (disturbed by the moon) and Obsessi (possessed by the devil).  
However, not everyone during this time conceptualized mental illness from a 
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supernatural perspective.  Paracelsus cited other categories which included naturalistic 
explanations for mental illness including Vesani (poisoned by food or drink) and 
Malancholici (insane by their nature).  This classification system suggests that the 
understanding of mental illness was relied mainly on supernatural explanations, however, 
some categories reflect the naturalistic understanding such as Vesani (poisoned by food 
or drink).  Therefore, although there were some naturalistic explanations for bizarre 
behavior, (such as being poisoned by food or drink) many chose to view this behavior as 
the result of supernatural phenomena. 
Renaissance and Enlightenment: The Gradual Shift to Naturalism 
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries there was again a shift in the 
conceptualization of mental illness.  The first mental hospital in the United States was 
founded in Williamsburg, Virginia, in 1773 (Davison, 1998).  Despite the shift to a 
somatic conceptualization, the treatment of the mentally ill at that time continued to be 
based on explanations that had little or no evidence.  This was exemplified by the 
practices of Benjamin Rush, considered to be the father of American psychiatry.  
Although Rush was known for improving the treatment of the mentally ill, one of his 
theories was that the mentally ill had an excessive amount of blood in their brains 
(Holmes, 1967).  He therefore drew large amounts of blood from his patients.  In 
addition, he believed in frightening mental patients and convincing them that they were 
going to die. (Davison, 1998; Farina, 1976; Holmes, 1967).  Although Rush’s approach 
would be viewed as cruel by today’s standards, his approach represented another shift in 
the conceptualization of mental illness toward a naturalistic account.   Here again, the 
confirmation bias was likely evident.  If Rush witnessed one of his patients improving, 
                                                                                                             Effects of the Confirmation Bias          10
that alone may have been enough for him to confirm that his approach was useful, despite 
the many who died during this practice.  This suggests that he likely disregarded large 
amounts of evidence that suggested that this practice was harmful to his patients and he 
likely reinterpreted it to fit with his initial hypothesis.  
Rush’s earlier theories were based largely on the works of other writers at the 
time, specifically, William Cullen, who held that diseases could be classified according to 
their symptoms and causes.  He wrote Synopsis Nosologae Methodicae, where he 
constructed an extensive nosology similar to the Linnean system of classification in 
biology (Holmes, 1967).  Cullen is known for transforming Von Haller’s work on the 
nervous system into a general explanation of nervous disease.  He developed a 
classification of diseases that he believed stemmed from “disordered motions of 
sensations of the nervous system,” and this is where the term “neurosis” derives (Knoff, 
1970), although many credit Freud with the term.  Cullen believed that nervous energy 
that stems from the nervous system determined the normal state of the body and believed 
that movement of the nervous fluid was the cause of all diseases (Knoff, 1970).  His term 
“neurosis” began to replace supernatural explanations such as humors, demons and 
spirits, representing a strong shift in the conceptualization of mental disorders back to a 
somatic approach.  As mentioned above, the somatic conceptualization of mental illness 
never completely disappeared from the 13th to the 18th centuries, and now supernatural 
explanations were increasingly supplanted by naturalistic ones.   
Cullen classified all diseases by their symptoms into classes, orders, genera, and 
species.  He classified man’s diseases into four categories: (a) pyrexias, (b) neuroses, (c) 
cachexias, and (d) local diseases.  “‘Neuroses’ was further divided into four orders: (a) 
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comas (including apoplexy), (b) adynamias, (including autonomic dysfunctions and 
hypochondriasis), (c) spasms (including convulsions and hysteria), and (d) vesanias (the 
term for madness in Cicero’s time)” (Knoff, 1970, p. 121).  This classification system 
was the most detailed to date, and symbolizes the shift back to a naturalistic account of 
mental illness.   
During the 18th century, the focus of treatment for the mentally ill kept in 
hospitals shifted from confinement to more humane treatment.  Phillippe Pinel led the 
movement to treat the mentally ill in a more humane fashion.  Pinel was also a critic of 
Cullen and developed his own system of classification consisting of five categories: (a) 
fevers, (b) inflammation, (c) hemorrhagic diseases, (d) neuroses (after Cullen), and (e) 
organic lesions.  He then identified four subcategories of mania which included mania, 
melancholia, dementia and idiocy (Knoff, 1970).  Pinel was in charge of an asylum in 
France, and during that time, removed the chains that were used to chain the patients to 
the walls.  Although his focus was on improving the conditions for the mentally ill, his 
approach also relates to the broader view of treating mental illness.  He believed that if 
these patients had become ill because of personal and/or social problems, he might be 
able to treat them by providing compassion, understanding and normal activity (Davison, 
1998).  This concern he had for his patients is consistent with other’s accounts that he 
was more interested in a clinical description of his patients rather than a rigid system of 
classification (Knoff, 1970). 
In the 1860s-1870s Louis Pasteur developed the germ theory of disease, which 
posited that disease is caused by microorganisms infecting the body.  This provided a 
theoretical link between syphilis and general paresis.  Further developments in the 
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understanding of syphilis arose in 1897 when Richard Von Krafft-Ebing inoculated 
patients with pieces of syphilitic sores, and they did not subsequently develop syphilis, 
suggesting that these patients had been infected earlier in their lives.  It was not until 
1905 that the specific organism that causes syphilis was discovered, which led to the idea 
that if one form of mental illness had a biological cause, then others likely did as well.  
Once again, Hippocrates’ theory of somatogenesis increased in popularity, and dominated 
the field well into the 20th century. 
Modern Classification of Psychopathology  
During the late 19th century, the German Psychiatrist Emil Kraepelin, developed a 
classification system in an attempt to investigate the organic nature of mental illnesses.  
He suggested that a group of symptoms that often occur together might have an 
underlying physical cause.  He believed that each mental disorder was unique with its 
own origins, symptoms, course and outcome.  Kraepelin identified two major groups: 
dementia praecox (Schizophrenia) and manic-depressive psychosis.  He believed that a 
chemical imbalance was the underlying cause of schizophrenia and an irregular 
metabolism was the cause of manic-depressive psychosis.  This approach to classification 
became the basis for other diagnostic categories and Kraepelin’s symptomatic approach 
to psychopathology was highly influential to the modern classification of mental 
disorders.  His theories on the etiology and diagnosis of psychiatric disorders would form 
the theoretical basis of modern diagnostic schemes, including the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders and the World Health Organization’s 
International Classification of Disease system.      
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Despite Kraepelin’s work, still not enough was known to understand the origins 
of these disorders.  Although more was understood about the nervous system in the 
1800s, the somatic origins of mental disorders remained poorly understood.  One 
discovery that was associated with senility and mental retardation was degeneration of 
brain cells, again supporting the idea that mental illness had a biological basis.  It had 
been known that some mental patients suffered from a deterioration of their mental and 
physical abilities including delusions of grandeur and paralysis (Davison, 1998).  In the 
19th Century, this disease became known as general paresis, and while some knew that 
these patients had suffered from syphilis previously, there were many competing ideas 
for its origins.  Griesinger (a German psychiatrist and neurologist) believed that liquor, 
tobacco and coffee could have been the cause, as the incidence was much higher in men.   
Whereas this still did not explain why women were also diagnosed with the 
disease, the confirmation bias is again apparent within this approach.  It appears that 
Griesinger developed the hypothesis that these illnesses were caused by liquor, tobacco 
and coffee simply because he observed this consumption frequently by men.  It follows 
that each time he met with a male patient with general paresis who also endorsed the 
consumption of these substances, he gathered evidence to confirm his initial hypothesis.  
In addition, he was disregarding information that was inconsistent with this hypothesis, 
such as the fact that women were also suffering from this illness.      
 Whereas somatogenesis was the model that many had been using to explain 
mental disorders, psychogenesis, or the view that mental disorders were due to 
psychological malfunctions was alive and well in the 19th century in Austria and France.  
For example, Franz Anton Mesmer believed that a certain distribution of magnetic fluid 
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in the body was the cause of hysterical disorders.  His treatment involved having patients 
sit around a covered tub.  Bottles were placed at the bottom of the tub and rods were 
placed in the bottles, protruded through the covering.  Mesmer would take the rods and 
touch certain parts of the patient’s bodies.  He believed that this would adjust the balance 
of the magnetic fluid and restore a person’s sanity.  Although this approach was largely 
somatogenic, Mesmer also practiced the technique of hypnosis, (a psychogenic approach 
to the treatment of the mentally ill) and the term “mesmerize” stems from Mesmer’s work 
(Davison, 1998).   
Jean Martin Charcot also studied hysterical states and once had a somatogenic 
belief about the origin of mental disorders.  However, his conceptualization changed 
when he witnessed his students hypnotized a woman and had her fake hysterical 
symptoms.  Charcot believed that she was truly hysterical, however his students showed 
him that they could remove the symptoms by waking her.  It was at this time that Charcot 
began to conceptualize mental illness from a psychogenic point of view (Davison, 1998).  
Throughout this and many of the treatments reviewed here, the confirmation bias 
was likely alive and well within the minds of these clinicians.  If a clinician were to 
witness a patient’s condition improving after the treatment, they were likely to continue 
with the treatment, despite evidence that suggested that it did not have any positive effect 
on their patients. 
 Stemming from Charcot’s work, Josef Breuer a physician in Vienna, hypnotized 
Anna O. and repeated some of the words she spoke when she was hypnotized.  It was 
shortly after that she was talking about events from her past with a great deal of emotion.  
He found that when she would wake from being hypnotized, she reported feeling better.  
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This lead to the technique known as the cathartic method (Davison, 1998).  Again, this 
reflected a shift from a somatogenic perspective to a perspective that suggested that 
mental illness stemmed from psychological problems or problems with the mind only.  
Throughout the works of Mesmer, Charcot and Breuer, mental illness was conceptualized 
from a psychogenic perspective.  However, they differed from other supernatural 
explanations in that their explanations were somewhat more naturalistic.  These 
approaches did not emphasize classification; rather the focus rested with the general 
principles of their theories and practices.        
Just as Kraepelin was making progress with his classification system, Freud 
interpreted mental illness from a new vantage point, unconscious motivation (Knoff, 
1970).  It was in 1909 that Freud and Jung visited the United States lecturing at Clark 
University in Worcester, Massachusetts.  It was shortly after this visit that an interest in 
psychoanalysis rose in the United Sates.  Psychoanalysis was widely popular in the 
United States during the 1930’s and 1940’s when many psychoanalysts arrived from 
Europe.  The psychoanalytic paradigm developed by Freud suggested that 
psychopathology results from unconscious conflicts.  Freud classified the psyche into a 
tripartite model of the id, ego and superego.  He believed that behavior results from a 
complex interaction of these three parts of the psyche.  Freud asserted that there are five 
psychosexual stages that children enter as they develop. The oral stage, lasting from birth 
to 18 months, represents the time when the id is satisfied by feeding, and the sucking that 
accompanies the feeding.  The anal stage, from 18 months to three years, represents the 
child’s pleasure from passing feces.  The phallic stage lasts from approximately age three 
to five or six when the child receives pleasure from stimulating the genitals.   During the 
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next stage, known as the latency stage, the id plays a lesser role in motivating the child’s 
behavior.  Finally the genital stage is also known as the adult stage in which sexual 
interests are the primary source of gratification.  Each person must resolve the conflicts 
between what the id desires and what the environment will provide during each stage of 
development.  If an insufficient resolution is achieved, Freud believed this would lead to 
a fixation at that particular stage of psychosexual development.  For example, this may 
take the form of an oral fixation that is due to an unresolved conflict between the id’s 
needs and the environment.  The child who sucks his or her thumb or the adult who 
smokes may be considered to have an oral fixation.   
Although the psychoanalytic approach was later criticized for lacking a clear 
classification system, Freud did classify disorders especially with regard to presumed 
etiology, i.e., the psychosexual stages stemming from conflicts between the id and 
superego.  In addition, the psychoanalytic approach distinguished between neurotic 
disorders and psychotic disorders.  Neurotic disorders were thought to result from a 
neuronal problem, whereas psychotic disorders were thought to result from psychogenic 
factors.  In addition, Freud asserted that people handle anxiety through the use of defense 
mechanisms, which are thought of as unconscious distortions of reality.  Freud classified 
these defense mechanisms into seven categories: (a) repression, (b) projection, (c) 
displacement, (d) reaction formation, (e) regression, (f) rationalization, and (g) 
sublimation.    
Whereas Freud’s conceptualization of psychopathology was widely accepted 
during the 20th century, his approach is now increasingly regarded as lacking a scientific 
basis.  Many of his key hypotheses are inherently unfalsifiable, and therefore cannot be 
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tested empirically.  Those that can be tested have generally failed to garner support.  
(Crews & Bulkeley, 2001).  It is especially in the case of unfalsifiable theories such as 
Freud’s that clinicians may evidence the confirmation bias.  In the case of Freud’s theory, 
there is always room for the confirmation bias to occur, as there is always a way to 
reframe disconfirming evidence to confirm the initial theory.  Freud’s theory does this by 
utilizing an explanation of unconscious processes, which cannot be measured.  Therefore, 
his theory can be relied upon to confirm ideas even when there is no outward supporting 
evidence.   
Another influential figure in the field of psychology in the 20th century was Erik 
Erikson, who believed that people suffer from identify crises.  These identity crises arise 
from challenges presented by one of Erikson’s eight psychosocial stages of development.  
According to Erikson’s theory if a person is able to meet the challenges presented by 
these stages, a crisis does not occur, however, if they are unable to learn and grow 
according to these stages, a crisis develops.  Although Erikson did not directly address 
classification in his theory as his focus was on the identity crisis itself, he did classify the 
stages of psychosocial development and different types of identity crises that arise from 
each.  His classification of psychosocial crises included:  (a) trust vs. mistrust, (b) 
autonomy vs. shame, doubt, (c) initiative vs. guilt, (d) industry vs. inferiority, (e) identity 
vs. identity confusion, (f) intimacy vs. isolation, (g) generativity vs. stagnation, and (h) 
integrity vs. despair.  One problem with his approach to psychopathology was that it was 
limited and narrowly focused on identity crises.  It is not clear how other psychological 
disorders such as schizophrenia or bipolar disorder would fit into his theory of 
psychosocial development.    
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Several decades later, it was the interpersonal school that became widely popular.  
Harry Stack Sullivan, Frieda-Fromm-Reichmann, and neo-Freudians such as Fromm and 
Horney all contributed greatly to the development and evolution of the interpersonal 
perspective.  The interpersonal approach focused on interactions among patients and their 
loved ones.  The origin of psychopathology was thought to be found in interpersonal 
interactions (Klerman, 1984).  Although Sullivan, Fromm-Reichmann and Horney’s 
interpersonal contributions focused more on the principles of their theories rather than 
classification, Fromm’s Sociological Theory included a classification of the ways in 
which people handle feelings of isolation.  He asserted that people develop certain 
dominant strategies or personality styles that he identifies as different character types.  
These include:  (a) the receptive character type, (b) the exploitative character type, (c) the 
hoarding character type, (d) the marketing character type, and (e) the productive character 
type (Carducci, 1998).  Again, whereas there were some attempts at classification among 
this group, these theories were lacking a comprehensive and systematic diagnostic 
classification system. 
Also during the early 20th century, behaviorists Pavlov, Watson, and Skinner 
made great strides with respect to human behavior, most notably, Pavlov’s classical 
conditioning and Skinners operant conditioning.  Although the behaviorists did not 
emphasize classification in the traditional sense, they did classify behavioral phenomena 
by their presumed functional etiology.  One example of this classification is abnormal 
behavior presumably caused by classical vs. operant conditioning.  Classical conditioning 
occurs when a neutral stimulus initially does not elicit a response.  After being paired 
with an unconditioned stimulus, it functions as a conditioned stimulus and elicits a 
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response.  The most common example of classical conditioning is the conditioned 
salivation response in Pavlov’s dogs.  Operant conditioning is the learning process by 
which the consequence of an operant response affects the likelihood that the response 
will occur in the future.  Again, although these theories do not include classification 
systems per se, they do categorize behaviors according to their supposed etiology.   
Despite Kraepelin’s attempt to develop a standardized classification system, 
Freud’s theory of psychoanalysis dominated the field until well into the twentieth 
century.  Other schools of thought such as the interpersonal school, and behaviorism had 
their own approach to classification, however, a more formal classification system was 
still lacking.    
Development of the Formal Diagnostic Classification Systems of Psychopathology 
 Although classification had been used in most of these earlier approaches to 
psychopathology, there was still no official list of diagnostic categories with operational 
criteria to use in assessment.  There were attempts at developing classification schemes, 
however many failed.  In 1882 the Royal Medico-Psychological Association developed a 
classification scheme, although it was never adopted by the members of the association 
(Fleming, 1933).  This classification scheme included eight general classes of mental 
disorders:  (a) oligophrenia (a mental deficiency, a condition of arrested or incomplete 
development of mind), (b) psychoneuroses (no differentiation was made between 
neuroses and psychoneuroses.  The criteria include an abnormal mental state 
characterized by mental or motor fatigability and irritability and included generalized fear 
and phobias), (c) schizophrenic psychoses (including dementia praecox and paraphrenia), 
(d) psychopathic constitution (including paranoia), (e) affective psychoses, (f) epileptic 
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psychoses, (g) general paralysis, and (h) dementia (Fleming 1934).  In 1932, the final 
revision of The Classification of Mental Disorders was published.  However, it was not 
adopted by the Council of the Association at the time, and another revision was finally 
accepted in 1933 and served as the official classification of the Royal Medico-
Psychological Association (Fleming, 1934).  The original eight categories remained, with 
the major difference being the inclusion of three additional categories: confusional states, 
other psychoses associated with organic brain disease, and undetermined types.  In 
addition to these three new categories, clinicians were asked to identify specifiers for 
each disorder.  These included (a) heredity, (b) deprivation and special sense (hearing, 
sight), (c) critical periods, (puberty, adolescence, etc.), (d) child-bearing, (e) mental 
factors such as “sudden stress” (f) physiological disturbances such as malnutrition, (g) 
trauma such as injuries or operations, (h) toxic factors such as alcohol, drugs or poisons, 
(i) deficiency diseases such as pellagra, (j) diseases of the nervous system, (k) diseases of 
other systems such as the cardio-vascular or endocrine systems, (l) no factor ascertained, 
and (m) no history obtained (Fleming, 1934).   At the time, this system was perhaps the 
most complex, not only with a classification system in place, but also a system to specify 
the suspected etiology of each disorder.   
In 1840, the initial reason for developing a classification manual in the United 
States was for statistical purposes.  As discussed by Frances, Pincus, First and Widiger in 
the introduction of the fourth edition of the DSM (American Psychiatric Association, 
1994), the first attempt to collect information on mental illness in the United States was 
the recording of one category “Idiocy/Insanity” in the 1840 census.  They go on to note 
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that by the 1880 census, there were seven recognized categories; (a) mania, (b) 
melancholia, (c) monomania, (d) paresis, (e) dementia, (f) dipsomania, and (g) epilepsy.   
The Association of Medical Superintendents of American Institutions for the 
Insane, a forerunner of the American Psychiatric Association, adopted a revised version 
of the British system in 1886 (Davison, 1998).  This group then adopted a new 
classification scheme in 1913 that included some of Kraepelin’s work.  However, 
consistency was still missing from these classification schemes.  In 1917, the Committee 
on Statistics of the American Psychiatric Association (at the time it was called the 
American Medico-Psychological Association) and the National Commission on Mental 
Hygiene (which later became the National Association for Mental Health) developed a 
plan to collect statistical information from mental hospitals across the U.S. (Coolidge & 
Segal, 1999).  Although the goal was clinical utility, the classification was still primarily 
a statistical one (American Psychiatric Association, 1994).  There were many attempts at 
an official widely accepted classification scheme between 1882 and 1948.  Contributors 
included the Royal Medico-Psychological Association, the Association of the Medical 
Superintendents of American Institutions for the Insane, American Medico-Psychological 
Association and the World Health Organization.  However, the various classification 
systems differed in the number of recognized diagnoses.  While some classified 
diagnoses for statistical use, others classified diagnoses for clinical use, and consistency 
was still lacking across these various classification schemes.  
An International List of Cause of Death has been in existence for statistical 
purposes since 1893.  This list was revised several times, and after World War II the 
World Health Organization adopted this list and produced the 6th revision which was then 
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titled the International Statistical Classification of Diseases, Injuries and Causes of 
Death known as the ICD (Dittman, 1991).  The ICD listed all known diseases as well as 
descriptions of abnormal behavior.  Mental Disorders had been added to the list in 1939, 
and although the WHO adopted this list, they did not accept the section on mental 
disorders.  Even though psychiatrists had assisted in the development of the ICD and 
pushed for the list to be accepted by the WHO, the American Psychiatric Association 
eventually published its own Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders in 
1952 (Dittman, 1991).   
The DSM-I included short descriptions of symptoms and briefly described each 
diagnostic category.  The DSM-I was an advance over these other approaches to 
classification, as there was an official list of disorders with operational criteria for each 
disorder.  However, the DSM-I was incompatible with the ICD-6, and there was a 
growing interest in developing an international classification of diseases in order to 
facilitate communication across countries (Spitzer & Wilson, 1968).  Therefore, 
American representatives worked with these international committees to revise the 
mental disorders section of the ICD-6 which became effective in 1968 (Spitzer & Wilson, 
1968).  In 1965 the American Psychiatric Association set out to prepare a new edition of 
the DSM that would be compatible with the ICD-8 list of mental disorders.  There were 
several ways in which the ICD-8 was modified for the development of the DSM-II.  The 
ICD-8 included changes such as (a) changes in the organization and sequence of 
disorders, (b) certain diagnoses were omitted, (c) other diagnoses were added, and finally 
(d) additional coding digits were used in order to achieve greater specificity among 
categories.   
                                                                                                             Effects of the Confirmation Bias          23
The first change in the DSM-II was a modification of terms.  For example, the 
DSM-I used the term Schizophrenic Reaction whereas DSM-II took the term reaction out 
and left it as “Schizophrenia.”  The second difference was with regard to the organization 
of the manual.  There were three major categories of mental disorders in the DSM-I 
whereas the DSM-II included ten categories.  The DSM-I was also inconsistent regarding 
multiple disorders.  Although it supported the general notion of multiple disorders, it did 
not allow certain combinations.  For example, if one disorder was thought to be 
symptomatic of another, (such as alcoholism was thought to be symptomatic of another 
underlying disorder such as depression) the disorder was not listed.  The DSM-II 
encouraged the identification of multiple disorders, even if one was symptomatic of 
another.  The DSM-II also encouraged clinicians to identify physical conditions as a 
separate diagnosis, whereas the DSM-I did not.  Finally, the DSM-II added three 
qualifying phrases to the already existing four phrases in the DSM-I.  The qualifying 
phrases refer to phrases such as “acute,” “chronic,” “mild,” “moderate,” and “severe” 
(Spitzer & Wilson, 1968).       
Despite the changes in the DSM-II there were still much needed improvements.  
The first two editions of the DSM reflected the dominant theoretical orientation at the 
time, which combined Freud’s theories of personality and Meyer’s psychodynamic 
theories (Grob, 1991).  Another major problem with the DSM-I and II were the 
descriptions of mental disorders, which were in need of elaboration and operational 
definitions.  Diagnosis was not reliable among clinicians and varied greatly from 
clinician to clinician.  Scull (1989) reported that some research demonstrated that for 
even the most severe cases, reliability among clinicians for diagnostic categories 
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remained poor, with under 50% inter-diagnostician agreement (Gold, 2002).  One 
example of the very low reliability was a study by Spitzer and Fleiss (1974).  They 
reanalyzed the reliability of psychiatric diagnosis before the operational approach was 
used.  Kappa coefficients ranged from .26 (neurotic depression) to .77 (organic brain 
syndrome).  Although .77 is considered good, most other disorders did not reach above a 
kappa coefficient of .55, suggesting major problems with diagnostic reliability.  
 In the 1960s and 1970s there were four main issues regarding the 
conceptualization and categorization of psychopathology that were debated among 
mental health professionals.  First, many said that psychiatry was not a legitimate part of 
medicine.  Szasz and his followers argued that without some evidence of a biological or 
physiological abnormality, using the medical model to interpret mental illness was just a 
way to control the deviant rather than truly practice medicine (Klerman, 1984).  Second, 
as mentioned above, there was low reliability among psychiatrists with respect to 
diagnosis.  Third, Karl Menninger argued that there were social and psychological 
consequences to labeling a patient with a psychiatric diagnosis.  One of the most 
influential studies regarding this criticism was conducted by Rosenhan (1973), “On Being 
Sane in Insane Places,” described below.   Finally, psychologists such as Lorr, Overall, 
and Eysenck believed in a dimensional approach to diagnosis and they disagreed with the 
categorical nature of the official classification system (Klerman, 1986). 
From the 1940s to the 1970s there was relatively little attention paid to diagnosis 
and classification.  This was in part due to the lack of connection between treatment 
decisions and diagnosis.  This was mostly true when psychoanalytic therapy was the 
primary treatment available to clients, as formal diagnosis and classification were not part 
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of the psychoanalytic assessment strategy.  Because this was most often the treatment of 
choice, it was not necessary to diagnose clients.  By the end of the 1960s, however, there 
was a growing awareness that without a reliable system for diagnosing psychopathology, 
there would be little progress made in the field (Klerman, 1986).   
Development of the DSM-III 
During the 1970’s Lehmann argued that there had been a long history of ignoring 
the need for diagnosis, nosology and classification (Lehmann, 1977).  This sparked a new 
interest in classification and diagnosis.  In the 1950’s Robins, Guze and others at 
Washington University had concluded that low reliability was due in large measure to the 
inability of two clinicians to agree upon identified symptoms and behaviors for a 
particular disorder prior to meeting with a patient.  They began developing a structured 
interview in an attempt to increase reliability among clinicians.  They worked to define 
the exact criteria for each of the 16 DSM-II disorders.  These criteria were published in 
individual papers and then integrated into one article in a classic 1972 paper by Feighner, 
et al. (1972) and led the way for improved reliability and empirical tests of validity 
(Matarazzo, 1983).  
By the 1970s the National Institute of Mental Health had recognized that 
depression likely had a psychobiological component.  It was later in the 1970s that 
Endicott and Spitzer, along with their colleagues at the New York Psychiatric Institute, 
Robins in St. Louis, and others at Columbia, Harvard, and Iowa medical schools joined 
together and conducted a federally funded study to investigate the psychobiology of 
depression.  This study allowed them to attempt to improve upon the Feighner criteria 
(1972) not only for depression but for other disorders as well.  Even though Feighner had 
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improved reliability, there was still a lack of knowledge among practicing clinicians in 
their understanding of how to elicit the information from a clinical interview (Helzer, 
1977; Matarazzo, 1983).  The tools they subsequently developed from this study were the 
manual of Research Diagnostic Criteria, (RDC) and the standardized Schedule of 
Affective Disorders (SADS) (Matarazzo, 1983).  
The RDC is a manual of Research Diagnostic Criteria which provides operational 
criteria, including both inclusion and exclusion criteria, for the descriptions of psychiatric 
syndromes.  For example, a diagnosis of depression required both the presence of sadness 
and sleep disturbances, but also a lack of symptoms such as delusions or hallucinations.  
However, after the development of these criteria, the group realized that this may present 
a problem for clinicians of different orientations.  That is, if a psychoanalytic clinician 
and a nondirective clinician each assess their patients differently, this may lead to 
different information being elicited from the same client.  The RDC criteria required a 
“yes/no” response to determine whether symptoms were present, and one potential 
problem was that different clinicians were not adept at interviewing patients in this 
manner (Matarazzo, 1983).  Therefore, the Schedule for Affective Disorders and 
Schizophrenia was developed and employed as a standardized interview for clinicians to 
use when assessing their clients.  The SADS provides questions, items and operationally 
defined criteria that rule in and rule out each of the of RDC diagnoses (Matarazzo, 1983).  
Endicott, Spitzer and Robins, (1978) reported high levels of reliability among clinicians 
using the RDC and the SADS.  
In addition to these advances, there were advances with respect to statistical 
techniques including the ability to save large data sets and send them electronically.  
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Another breakthrough in the field was the emergence of pharmacotherapy and the 
implications that this had for the biological basis of mental illness.  These studies quickly 
demonstrated that standardized interview techniques could provide better reliability 
among clinicians, as well as more reliable estimates in epidemiological community 
surveys.  However, although reliability was improving, reliability was still far from 
optimal for some diagnostic categories.  For example, in one study of lifetime SADS and 
RDC diagnosis, the initial vs. the consensus coefficients ranged from .06 for Bipolar 2, to 
.88 for Bipolar 1.  Clearly, while there were improvements, there were still some 
categories needing improvement in reliability. 
The Neo-Kraepelinians argued that diagnostic categories should be based on a 
description of course and symptoms without attempting to prove the etiology of the 
disorders, and this was the approach taken by the Washington University group.  The 
group focused on the development of operational criteria in an attempt to keep the field 
moving forward and to increase reliability in psychological diagnosis that was lacking in 
the field until the late 1970s (Klerman, 1986).  They were most interested in biological 
and genetic explanations for mental illness and focused on the categorical approach to 
psychiatric diagnosis.  They believed that a focus on syndromes had the potential to 
uncover the etiology of some disorders; however, a comprehensive understanding of the 
etiology was not a necessity for reliability among clinicians.   
It was Robins, Suze and Winokur who were known as the original Neo-
Kraepelinians at Washington University.  This group was highly influential and the 
DSM-III was developed based on many of their ideas.  Spitzer describes the steps in the 
development of the DSM-III in Spitzer and Williams, (1980) and in Spitzer’s 
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introduction to the DSM-III.  First, The American Psychiatric Association Task Force on 
Nomenclature and Statistics was appointed with Spitzer as chairperson.  The task force 
included psychiatrists, epidemiologists, and others as consultants.  Additionally, the 
American Psychological Association appointed three psychologists to the committee.  
Eventually, 14 advisory committees were asked to support the development of the DSM-
III.  As the DSM-III began to emerge, there were many field trials taking place between 
1976 and 1980, and each of the clinical descriptions of the DSM-II were developed to 
include operational criteria for the 16 major categories and the 187 specific disorders in 
the DSM-III.  Because many of those researchers were involved in the development of 
the Feighner criteria, the RDC and the SADS were also involved in the development of 
the DSM-III, as there are many similarities among them.   However, although some of the 
disorders listed in the DSM-III are very similar to those in the RDC, there are differences 
as well, including the criteria for disorders such as Schizophrenia and Major Depression 
(Spitzer & Williams, 1980).  Two additional diagnostic interviews were developed after 
the publication of the DSM-III, known as the Renard Diagnostic Interview and the 
Diagnostic Interview Schedule, both of which were designed to improve reliability in 
assessment and diagnosis even with use by lay persons (Helzer, Robbins, Croughan & 
Welner, 1981; Robins, Helzer, Ratcliff & Seyfried, 1982).  
With the recognition of the need for a system of diagnosis, nosology and 
classification came the Feighner criteria, a compilation of individual papers addressing 
the operational criteria for the DSM-II disorders.  The Feighner criteria improved 
reliability among clinicians, however the RDC and the SADS further improved reliability 
and gave clinicians from different theoretical orientations a common ground to start from 
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when interviewing clients.  All of these important developments contributed to the 
development of the DSM-III.  Once the DSM-III was developed, an assessment of its 
utility was needed.  
Utility of the DSM-III  
There are several strengths of the DSM-III, including (a) provisions for the 
recognition of multiple disorders, (b) inclusion of the operational criteria with specific 
exclusion and inclusion criteria, (c) demonstrable reliability based on field testing, (d) a 
multiaxial system of diagnosis that allows accommodation of diverse aspects of patients’ 
experiences, and (e) recognition of and provisions for the implicit necessity for further 
change directed by research based on evidence rather than assertions of competing 
ideological camps (Klerman et al. 1984).  Klerman asserted that two of these strengths 
have had a major impact on clinical practice.  The first is the use of operational criteria 
and the second is the multiaxial classification system.  In response to the arguments about 
the need for increased reliability, many attempts have been made to understand the 
origins of mental illness and to increase reliability.  The DSM-III encompasses these 
efforts.  The multiaxial classification system addresses a problem that many have felt in 
the field.  That is, the disorder is of scientific interest, but the unit of practice is the 
patient.  This problem has contributed to the debate about the clinical relevance of 
diagnostic systems.  Two arguments have been made regarding this topic.  First, 
clinicians claimed that the diagnostic categories were inadequate for understanding the 
complex individual patient, and their interpersonal relationships (Frances, et al. 1991).  
Second, some argued that assigning patients to categories contributed to 
depersonalization and fostered a gap in the doctor-patient relationship (Klerman, 1986).  
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However, the five axial system helps to address syndromes, while also addressing 
individual aspects of the disorder (Klerman, 1986).   
Although these strengths are promising, there have also been criticisms of the 
DSM-III that have lead to questions about its reliability and utility.  Constructing 
definitions of the basic terminology is one weakness in any classification system, and is a 
weakness of the DSM-III.  The definition of a “mental disorder” or “disease” is one area 
in which the DSM has struggled, not only in the DSM-III but those that followed it as 
well.  Rather than attempt to provide a definition for the term “mental disorder,” the 
DSM-III and those that followed elected to avoid defining the term (Gold, 2002).  The 
DSM-III has also been criticized for lacking objective measures that might serve to 
establish the presence or absence of a mental disorder (Widiger, et al, 1991; Zarin & 
Earls, 1993).  Wakefield (1992) introduced the notion that mental disorders can be best 
understood through scientific criteria as well as societal value.  He argues that this can be 
done through the use of what he terms “harmful dysfunction.”  He suggests that “harm” is 
a judgment about the desirability, or lack thereof, of a condition and “dysfunction” is the 
system’s failure to function as it is intended to by natural selection.  He claims that this 
approach is a more objective way to approach mental disorders.  However, others such as 
Lilienfeld and Marino (1995), have criticized Wakefield’s model for several reasons.  
First, they argue that there are mental functions that are not direct evolutionary 
adaptations, but instead are neutral by-products of adaptations.  That is, many important 
mental and physical systems were not likely designed by evolution to perform a 
particular function.  Rather, they are by-products of adaptations that have taken on 
functions different from their initial functions.  They give the example of religion, 
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political beliefs, music, art, etc.  They argue that these abilities are likely not the result of 
natural selection, but rather are an indirect consequence of natural selection for domain 
specific capacities, such as verbal and spatial ability.  Second, they assert that Wakefield 
neglects the fact that natural selection almost always results in variability across 
individuals.  They argue that there is usually great variability across different individuals 
for any given system response.   
“…the most evolutionarily adaptive response for each system necessarily differs 
across individuals.  In part, this is almost certainly because biological and 
psychological systems do not operate in a vacuum: The most adaptive response of 
a given system frequently depends on the functioning of other systems” (p. 6). 
Finally, they argue that many consensual disorders represent evolutionarily adaptive 
reactions to danger or loss.  Wakefield (1992) noted that dysfunction is a failure for a 
system to adequately perform its intended function.  However, Lilienfeld and Marino 
(1995) argue that there are many reactions of a system to threat or bodily harm that can 
be seen as adaptive rather than a failure to follow intended functions.  They give the 
example of flu symptoms where a fever, coughing and sneezing are adaptive responses to 
rid the body of an illness.  They state that one may argue that these symptoms typically 
interfere with the body’s natural functioning, as someone with a flu usually has a 
decreased appetite.  However, the system is responding appropriately given the presence 
of an illness.  They also give the example of a specific phobia or blood phobia.  Today, 
we have fewer reasons to fear the sight of blood than we did thousands of years ago due 
to medical advancements.  Therefore counter to Wakefield’s theory of a dysfunction, 
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some phobias may be the product of systems that are performing too well to the way they 
were intended.   
Other critics questioned how scientific it was to develop a classification system 
through the use of a committee.  Some have argued that the process of consensus and 
compromise inherent in committees is unscientific and is a disadvantage in developing a 
classification system (Klerman, 1984).  However, Gold (2002) argues that although there 
are some limitations to developing a classification system based on consensus (e.g., peer 
influence), there is a need for committee work in the development of science.  Because 
classification systems are developed by humans, the use of committees is not beyond 
reason.  Another common critique of the DSM-III was based on statements that the 
DSM-III claims to be atheoretical, but that there is no such thing as a truly atheoretical 
approach to diagnosis (Follette, and Houts, 1996; Rogler, 1997; Wakefield, 1999; 
Wilson, 1993).  This criticism stems from the clear Neo-Kraepelin influence on the 
DSM-III.  Gold (2002) asserts that incorporating a theoretical approach does not 
necessarily invalidate a classification system, as it is not possible to have an atheoretical 
classification system.  Follette & Houts (1996) assert that the DSM claimed to be 
atheoretical for two pragmatic reasons.  The first was that the task force wanted to avoid 
explicit statements about an underlying model in an attempt to appeal to the broader 
mental health community.  Second, the psychoanalytic theory that influenced the DSM-II 
was scientifically inadequate, and rather than attempt to argue for another theory, the 
choice was made to avoid theory completely.  Still another criticism is that the DSM-III 
has emphasized transient surface phenomena, and has not focused on clinical course and 
human development.  The critics argue that there has been an emphasis on diagnostic 
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reliability at the expense of diagnostic validity (Klerman, 1984).  It has been argued that 
there is an artificial quality of using methods based on observations to define mental 
illness, and they assert that this is demonstrated through the increased number of 
diagnoses of each revision of the DSM (Gold, 2002).  
Arguments have also been made regarding the DSM’s definition of what 
constitutes normality and abnormality, and that these judgments are based on the norms 
of a select group of mostly Caucasian male professionals.  In addressing this point, 
several critics have pointed out the overrepresentation of women in a number of 
diagnostic categories such as Histrionic and Borderline Personality Disorders.  However, 
although there may be an overrepresentation of women in some diagnostic categories, 
there are also categories in which men are far more frequently diagnosed than women, 
such as Antisocial Personality Disorder and substance use disorders such as Alcoholism 
(Turner & Herson, 1997).  In addition, the DSM-III has been criticized for its European 
cultural focus, disregarding non-European cultures and ignoring the influence of the 
culture in the presentation of mental disorders.  Therefore, many have argued that the 
DSM-III does not represent the countries or cultures outside of the North America 
(Fabrega, 1991; Mezzich, et al.1999; Widiger, et al. 1991).  
Finally, many of the criticisms of the DSM have originated from the 
antipsychiatry movement.  These critics argue that there are social and psychological 
consequences of labeling someone as “mentally ill.”  Szasz argued against the existence 
of mental illness, especially without some kind of biological or physiological evidence.  
These critics have suggested that there is a great potential for the social misuse of some 
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diagnostic categories.  The most frequently cited example being that homosexuality was 
classified as a mental illness in the DSM-II (Gold, 346).  
Whereas there have been many criticisms of the DSM-III, it nevertheless signified 
a great advance in the scientific approach to classification and diagnosis.  However, 
further revisions were still needed.   
Evolution of DSM-III to DSM-III-R, and III-R to IV 
In 1983 the American Psychiatric Association began working on a revision of the 
DSM-III.  This was done for several reasons.  First, data emerged from newer studies 
showing inconsistencies with some of the DSM-III diagnostic criteria.  Second, although 
there were extensive field trials before the publication of the DSM-III, the data had since 
shown to be unclear, inconsistent and even contradictory to the interpretations prior to the 
publication of the DSM-III.  Because of this, the diagnostic criteria as well as the 
systematic descriptions of each disorder were in need of review for consistency, clarity, 
and conceptual accuracy, and then revision when it was necessary.  Finally, the American 
Psychiatric Association was asked to aid in the development of the ICD-10 and the DSM-
IV was expected to coincide with the ICD-10.  However with the growing scientific 
literature on psychopathology, a revision of the DSM-III was needed before expected 
development of the DSM-IV in the 1990s (American Psychiatric Association, 1980).    
The task-force working on the DSM-IV conducted a three stage process that 
included reviews of the literature, re-analysis of already-collected data sets and extensive 
issue-focused field trials.  The domains considered in making decisions for changes 
included the clinical utility, reliability, descriptive validity, psychometric performance 
characteristics of individual criteria and a number of validating variables (American 
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Psychiatric Association, 1994).  When a review of the literature suggested a lack of 
evidence for the resolution of an issue, two resources were used, namely, data re-analysis 
and field trials.  Twelve field trials included more than 70 sites and evaluated more than 
6,000 subjects.  They collected information on the reliability and performance 
characteristics of each criteria set as a whole, as well as of the specific items within each 
criteria set.  The authors also state that “the field trials also helped to bridge the boundary 
between clinical research and clinical practice by determining how well suggestions for 
change that are derived from clinical research findings apply in clinical practice” 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994, p. xix).  With all of the improvements of the 
DSM-III, some argued that there were new editions of the DSM being published, such as 
the DSM-IV from the DSM-IIIR, without any real gains in knowledge (Gold, 2002).  
However, because the tenth version of the ICD was published, the DSM task force 
attempted to resolve the inconsistencies that remained between them.   
The revision of the DSM-IV to the DSM-IV-TR was a task that was undertaken in 
an attempt to bridge the span between the publication of the DSM-IV and the DSM-V.  
The following goals of the DSM-IV-TR were as follows: (a) correct factual errors 
identified in the DSM-IV, (b) review the DSM-IV to ensure that all information 
continued to be up-to-date, (c) make any revisions necessary based on additions to the 
literature since 1992, (d) make improvements to enhance the educational value of the 
DSM-IV and (e) to update the ICD-9-CM codes that were changed since the DSM-IV 
1996 Coding Update (American Psychiatric Association, 1994).  
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In evaluating the various revisions of the DSM, it is important to consider the 
psychometric status of the diagnoses.  Specifically, the reliability and validity of the 
disorders in the DSM are of great importance. 
Reliability was assessed during the DSM-IV field trials, and the results revealed a 
mixed pattern, with excellent inter-diagnostician reliability for some disorders, and only 
modest reliability for others.  Reliability for distinguishing between autism and another 
pervasive developmental disorder was assessed through pairs of experienced raters.  They 
exhibited excellent agreement (kappa = .85).  Reliability for Attention-
Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder for test-retest agreement and agreement with the 
clinician’s validation diagnosis for DSM-IV was .61 for combined type, .64 for 
predominantly inattentive type, and .51 for predominantly hyperactive-impulsive type.  
Reliability for Schizophrenia was generally high, with kappa coefficients ranging from 
.79 to .97.  For the Mood Disorders, reliability ranged from .43 to .82 in the past month, 
and reliability for lifetime mood disorders ranged from .36 to .81.  Obsessive-compulsive 
disorder reliability was somewhat lower, with kappa coefficients ranging from .55 to .88.  
The inter-rater reliability for a lifetime Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) diagnosis 
was .85, and .86 for current PTSD.  The median kappa value for the five sites 
investigating the reliability of sleep disorders ranged from .30 for all listed diagnoses to 
.38 for the first diagnosis only.  Clearly, there are several disorders for which reliability is 
excellent; however, there are still others in need of improvement.    
Validity is inherently a much more complex issue than reliability, as there are 
several different types of validity.  In addition, validity is more complex because most 
types of validity are difficult to assess.  In addition, validity is not as well established for 
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many disorders and appears to differ by disorder.  For example, the distinction between 
unipolar Major Depressive Disorder and Bipolar Disorder has more validity than the 
distinction between Social Anxiety Disorder (generalized subtype) and Avoidant 
Personality Disorder (Herbert, Hope & Bellack, 1992).   
The DSM-IV and DSM-IV-TR represent improvements on the DSM-III based on 
the research performed especially with respect to the field trials.  However, they do not 
represent a fundamental departure from the basic logic and structure of the DSM-III.  
Consequently, the problems and criticisms identified with the DSM-III are still relevant 
with the DSM-IV-TR.  Although the use of the DSM has become widespread, there 
remain important unresolved problems, and scholarly debate has continued with respect 
to alternative classification schemes.  
Alternatives to Traditional Psychodiagnosis   
Treatment Utility.  The validity of the DSM-III and DSM-IV is judged primarily 
on the basis of traditional psychometric theory.  Some have questioned this approach and 
have proposed an alternative method to evaluate the quality of diagnosis known as 
treatment utility (Bisset & Hayes, 1999; Hayes, & O’Brien, 1990; McKnight, Nelson, 
Hayes, & Jarrett, 1984).  Treatment Utility has been proposed as an alternative to 
traditional psychometrics as a means for assessing the quality of diagnosis (Bissett & 
Hayes, 1999; Hayes & O’Brien, 1990; McKnight, et al. 1984).  Treatment Utility is 
defined as “the degree to which an assessment method contributes to positive treatment 
outcomes” (Hayes, Nelson & Jarrett, 1987).  An assessment is thought to have treatment 
utility when positive outcomes occur during the treatment process, which are linked to 
the method of assessment (Hayes, et al. 1987).  Some argue that the DSM-IV currently 
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has a limited ability to use syndromal classification to lead to etiology, choice of 
treatment, and treatment response (Bissett & Hayes, 1999).  There has been some 
research to support this view (Kratochwill & McGivern, 1996; Kratochwill & Plunge, 
1992).  Bissett & Hayes argue that,  
Logically, no diagnostic system can make much of a difference at the level of 
treatment outcome until it produces reliably differential treatment linked to the 
diagnostic categories.  The poor correlation between syndromes and treatment is 
demonstrated by the application of essentially the same treatment technologies 
across a broad range of syndromal disorders, such as the application of cognitive 
therapy to mood (Beck, Rush, Shaw & Emery, 1979) anxiety, (Michelson & 
Ascher, 1987) and personality (Beck & Freeman, 1990) disorders, with only 
minimal change (p. 381).  
Although, treatment utility is not widely used today, it nevertheless represents a 
potentially viable alternative to psychometric theory.  However, treatment utility is not 
the only alternative to the current psychometric standards. 
 Functional Analysis.  Some researchers have suggested alternatives to the 
syndromal classification of the DSM such as a functional analytic approach.  Whereas the 
DSM primarily takes a nomothetic approach to diagnosis, a functional analytic approach 
takes an idiographic perspective, focusing on the individual client.  Nelson-Gray and 
Farmer, (1999) argue that it is possible for both approaches to be used simultaneously.  
That is, they suggest that the DSM may serve as a valuable starting point, possibly acting 
as a guide for a functional analytic approach to diagnosis.  However, Bissette and Hayes 
(1999) argue that this is unlikely without an interactive effect of functional analysis on 
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the syndromes themselves.  They also assert that the DSM system is closed to a more 
idiographic approach, and therefore suggest that what is needed is a nomothetic, 
syndromal level of classification that is also functionally derived.  They suggest that a 
true functional analysis would have the ability to re-categorize the current classification 
system through a functional approach.  They argue that this may be the only possible 
outcome if a functional analytic approach were to be nomothetically successful.  “A large 
set of functional analyses may reveal common functional processes.  This could lead to a 
nomothetic level of analysis that is also functionally derived- a classification system 
based on functional categories” (Bissett & Hayes, 1999, p. 381). However, as they 
acknowledge, the DSM’s syndromal approach is not based on a functional approach and 
may be resistant to reorganizing the existing categories into functional categories based 
on a behavioral analysis.  In addition, there is very little research on inter-rater reliability 
of functional analysis, making this a difficult alternative to the traditional 
psychodiagnostic approach.   
 Expert Systems, Logical Functional Analysis, and the Functional Diagnostic 
Category Approach.  Hayes & Follette (1992) have argued that functional analysis has 
failed primarily because of its lack of replicability, making it difficult to study in a 
scientific way, as is so easily done with the current DSM syndromal classification 
system.  They do offer several alternatives including the development of expert systems, 
logical functional analytic systems, and functional diagnostic categories.  In their 
discussion of expert systems, they argue that when clinicians argue about how to conduct 
a functional analysis of a case, there is no clear answer as to who is more accurate.  They 
suggest that a therapist could conduct a number of functional analyses under controlled 
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conditions.  Then the kind of principles used, information collected and treatment 
recommendations made could be specified.  Eventually, several algorithms would be 
identified and when enough are identified, an “expert system” or “a coherent and 
specified system of decision rules- could be developed that systematizes, at least to some 
degree, what the clinicians does” (Hayes & Follett, 1992, p. 356).  In addressing their 
second alternative of logical functional analytic systems, Hayes and Follett suggest the 
use of a system in which there are specified treatment rules depending on the results of 
each stage of assessment.  They give the example of taking 80 clients with social skills 
problems and randomly assigning them to two conditions.  One group could be a logical 
functional system and the other could be either another logical system, or an expert 
system.  With a series of these studies, they believe that it is possible for stable systems 
of functional analysis to emerge as an alternative method for evaluating categories.  
Finally, they present the functional diagnostic category approach.  
If one were to perform many individual functional analyses from a particular 
point of view, a variety of patterns might emerge.  By arranging these into 
functional categories with assessment methods and treatment recommendations 
related to them, a kind of diagnostic system would result.  The guiding principle 
behind the categorization would not be simply agreement, but utility.  Many 
different and competing functional diagnostic systems could result, but the 
treatment utility of these systems would allow competitive systems to be 
compared.  Such functional categories would provide a general framework that 
could complement the individual application of classic functional analyses (p. 
358).  
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Functional analysis is still debated as a viable alternative to the current syndromal 
classification system.  Some argue that functional analysis is the clear alternative, 
whereas others argue that it is impossible to study functional analysis scientifically, as it 
is not possible to replicate an idiographic behavioral interpretation.  Hayes and Follette 
(1992) offer potentially viable alternatives to traditional diagnostic categorization system 
based on the general idea of functional analysis and utilizing treatment utility as the core 
evaluative tool.   
Narrative Approach.  Goncalves, Machado, Korman and Angus (2002) argue 
that a narrative approach to diagnosis should be considered.  Their argument stems from 
the results of the classic Rosenhan study (1973).  In this study, eight pseudo-patients 
checked themselves into a mental hospital complaining of schizophrenic like symptoms.  
Specifically, they complained of hearing voices.  They then behaved as they normally 
would and did not present with any additional psychotic symptoms.  Rosenhan found that 
most of the pseudo-patients’ actions were interpreted by the psychiatrists as being 
abnormal.  Goncalves et al. argue that this is one example of how psychopathology is a 
system of meanings that expresses itself through the organization of language such as 
narratives, or stories that people tell to create consistency and meaning.  Although they 
find that narratives are of great interest by themselves as an indicator of how clients 
organize their experience, they believe that aspects of the narrative can provide important 
information on client problems.  The staff in the Rosenhan study never attempted to talk 
with the pseudo-patients, but rather they observed their behaviors from afar and 
interpreted them to fit into their original hypothesis.  Goncalves et al. argue that 
narratives offer more information and provide a more sophisticated insight into the 
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problems a patient is dealing with.  They have developed a coding system for narratives 
and assert that diagnosis should involve analysis of a narrative in order to choose an 
appropriate treatment.    
 In summary, the need for revisions of the DSM-III stemmed from studies showing 
inconsistencies in the studies conducted during the course of the development of the 
DSM-III.  The criteria were reviewed for consistency, clarity and conceptual accuracy.  
The DSM-IV revisions were based primarily on data reanalysis and field trials.  Finally, 
the revisions of the DSM-IV for the DSM-IV-TR were made in an attempt to bridge the 
span between the DSM-IV and the DSM-V.  The DSM-IV field trials have shown that 
reliability is good for most of the categories; however, improvement can still be made.  
Validity is more complex because most types of validity are difficult to assess.  In 
addition, validity is not as well established for many disorders and appears to differ by 
disorder.   Finally, several alternatives have been proposed to either replace the existing 
classification system, or improve the evaluation of the system.  These include (a) focus 
on treatment utility rather than reliability and validity (Hayes & O’Brien, 1990; 
McKnight, Nelson, Hayes & Jarrett, 1984), (b) a functional analytic approach (Nelson-
Gray & Farmer, 1999), (c) experts systems, (d) logical functional analysis, (e) functional 
diagnostic category approach (Hayes & Follette, 1992), and (f) a narrative approach 
(Goncalves, Machado, Korman & Angus, 2002).  
 Whereas the alternatives proposed to replace or improve the DSM-IV, there are 
problems with each alternative.  First, treatment utility as a way to assess the quality of 
the current diagnostic system remains a viable alternative.  However, it has been argued 
that using the same treatment technologies for a broad range of syndromal disorders is a 
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weakness with the current system.  This is not necessarily the case as the application of 
the cognitive model to a broad range of disorders has proven to be highly effective.  With 
respect to a functional analytic approach, one problem is that there may be several 
analyses for the same case and there is no way to determine a clear answer when two 
analyses conflict.  Second, a complete reorganization would be needed for the existing 
categories of the DSM into functional categories.  Finally, idiographic behavioral 
interpretations will likely prove difficult to replicate.  The expert systems, logical 
functional analysis and functional diagnostic categories also hold similar problems, such 
as the need for a complete reorganization of the DSM.  In addition, these approaches are 
extremely cumbersome to conduct.  Problems with the narrative approach include factors 
such as a lack of consistency.  Narratives may also lack the necessary relevant 
information for clinicians to make a diagnosis, information that can be obtained with the 
use of a structured clinical interview.  However, narratives may be useful as a supplement 
to the structured clinical interview, and likely, patients construct narratives on their own 
within the clinical setting just by explaining their presenting problems.  Therefore, 
although these alternatives may improve the current diagnostic system in the future, for 
now they are in need of revision before they will likely impact on future editions of the 
DSM.         
Factors Impacting the Accuracy of Psychiatric Diagnosis  
 Despite whatever diagnostic system is chosen, research has identified a variety of 
factors that impact the accuracy of the diagnostic process.  Several factors have been 
identified that impact the accuracy of psychiatric diagnosis.  Some of these include 
overconfidence (Oskamp, 1965), reliance on memory (Arkes, 1986), lack of use of a 
                                                                                                             Effects of the Confirmation Bias          44
structured interview (Fals-Stewart & William, 1994), lack of a multi-modal assessment 
(Cumpsty, 1996), confusing medical symptoms with psychiatric symptoms (Scheinbaum, 
1979), and several information processing biases and heuristics (Ashcraft, 2002; 
Friedlander & Phillips, 1984; Silverman, 1992).  
Disclosure within the therapeutic context may vary greatly from one client to 
another.  The amount of information that a client discloses during his or her first session 
may have a significant impact on the accuracy of diagnosis.  New clients may not feel 
comfortable disclosing very personal information prior to developing a rapport with their 
therapist, and a therapist will likely not make an accurate diagnosis if important relevant 
information is missing.  However, although a lack of information would clearly impact 
the accuracy of diagnosis, there is some research that asserts that as more information is 
available to clinicians, their diagnostic accuracy does not improve (Gambara & Leon, 
1996).  Gambara and Leon (1996) found that confidence increased as clinicians receive 
more information.  However, at some point in the information gathering process, the 
accuracy of diagnosis did not improve, regardless of the amount of information (Oskamp, 
1965).  Oskamp (1965) also found that overconfidence in clinical judgments may impact 
the accuracy of diagnosis.  That is, if clinicians were not overly confident, they may take 
a more careful look at the information presented to them without assuming that their 
diagnosis is correct.  Arkes (1986) found similar results, suggesting that lack of 
awareness, overconfidence, and reliance on memory instead of progress notes add to 
errors in diagnostic judgments. 
Fals-Stewart and William (1994) argue that at times, errors in diagnosis result 
from not using a structured diagnostic interview.  They recognize that although it is time 
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consuming to use a structured interview, accuracy drops significantly when clinicians do 
not use them.  In addition, Spitzer (1983) found that clinicians were far less accurate in 
assessing clients without a structured interview than assessing with a structured 
interview.  He argued that that the accuracy was so poor for clinicians without a 
structured interview and so great for lay people using a structured interview that 
clinicians may need to show that advances in technology have not rendered them 
superfluous in the task of clinical assessment.    
 Cumpsty (1996) conducted a study assessing supervisor’s perception of 
supervisee burnout.  She found that the supervisors’ accuracy of diagnosis was low to 
moderate.  She suggests that the use of a multi-modal assessment would likely improve 
the accuracy of diagnosis and multi-modal assessments would likely improve the 
accuracy of diagnosis in many settings.    
 Elstein, Shulman and Sprafka (1978) found that clinicians’ accuracy was affected 
when they made diagnoses very early in the assessment process.  These authors found 
that the most accurate clinicians were those who waited until later in the assessment 
process to make their final diagnosis, suggesting that perhaps clinicians should defer their 
diagnostic judgments until they have sufficient information from their clients.   
 Childs, Mercer and Childs (1993) assessed the accuracy of diagnosis in patients 
referred for inpatient brain injury rehabilitation.  They found that errors in diagnosis may 
result from confusion in terminology, lack of extended observation of clients and lack of 
skill or training in assessment.  Although this study was conducted on the accuracy of 
neurological assessment, the specific factors highlighted, including lack of training in 
assessment and confusion with terminology apply to the general clinical setting as well. 
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 Scheinbaum (1979) investigated the effects of medical disorders such as 
hypoglycemia and delerium that produce psychiatric symptoms and are often confused 
with mental illness.  Due to the rates of misdiagnosis and the costs of prolonged 
psychiatric hospitalization, the author suggests that more sophisticated diagnostic 
measures are needed.  Some of these include (a) obtaining a detailed history, (b) a careful 
review of the symptoms checklist, (c) a detailed physical examination, (d) biochemical 
evaluations, (e) routine urinalysis, (f) urine drug screen, and (g) a complete blood count.   
 Finally, many studies have investigated the impact of cognitive biases on the 
accuracy of decision making (Ashcraft, 2002; Friedlander & Phillips, 1984; Silverman, 
1992). These biases and their effects on decision making are discussed below.   
 Many factors contribute to the inaccuracy of diagnosis.  Some of these include 
overconfidence (Oskamp, 1965), reliance on memory (Arkes, 1986), lack of use of a 
structured interview (Fals-Stewart & William, 1994), lack of a multi-modal assessment 
(Cumpsty, 1996), confusing medical symptoms with psychiatric symptoms (Scheinbaum, 
1979), and various cognitive biases and heuristics (Ashcraft, 2002; Friedlander & 
Phillips, 1984; Silverman, 1992).  Some of these factors have relatively obvious 
remedies, such as using a structured interview and a multi-modal assessment.  Others are 
more difficult to address, such as overconfidence in clinical and diagnostic skills.  This is 
more indicative of a cognitive bias that may require a more sophisticated approach to 
improve accuracy in diagnosis.         
Cognitive Biases and Heuristics 
Cognitive biases and heuristics can significantly impact a clinician’s ability to 
make objective decisions.  As defined by Garb (2003), “biases are beliefs or 
                                                                                                             Effects of the Confirmation Bias          47
preconceptions that adversely influence clinicians’ interpretations of available data” (p. 
24).  Heuristics can be thought of as shortcuts that describe how clinicians make 
judgments, treatment decisions, or both (Garb, 2003).  Generally, biases stem from the 
use of heuristics.  That is, biases exist within the context of cognitive short-cuts.  This is 
because anything that leads to storage of information in memory can influence reasoning 
because judgments are based on recalled information (Ashcraft, 2002).  
Examples of common biases include (a) the confirmatory bias, (b) the 
overconfidence bias, (c) the hindsight bias, (d) the race bias, (e) the gender bias, (f) the 
familiarity bias, (g) the anchoring or primacy bias, and (h) the vividness bias.  The 
confirmatory bias occurs when individuals knowingly or unknowingly review 
information in a way that they search out and highlight information that is consistent with 
an initial hypothesis or judgment, and ignore or de-emphasize inconsistent information.  
Overconfidence occurs when individuals are more confident in their hypotheses than is 
warranted based on the amount or quality of information they have received.  The 
hindsight bias refers to the tendency for knowledge of a particular outcome event to 
influence the perceived likelihood of that event, leading to incorrect explanations for the 
occurrence of the event.  Essentially, this describes the mental processes that occur when 
individuals create explanations for events that have already occurred.  Race and gender 
biases occur when judgments are considered more valid for one racial or gender group 
than another.  Familiarity bias refers to the notion that familiar information such as 
famous names are more easily recalled (Ashcraft, 2002).  The anchoring or primacy bias 
occurs when people are exposed to identical information, but in varying order, resulting 
in significantly different judgments.  For example, a client’s diagnosis may be related to 
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the time a clinician is exposed to pathognomonic information.  A different diagnosis may 
result from presenting information earlier in treatment versus later.  Finally, Vividness 
biases occur when the information stored in memory is more vivid than other 
information.  For example, even though statistically air travel is safer than car travel, the 
report of an airplane crash is more vivid, thereby leading to greater fears about air travel 
relative to car travel (Ashcraft, 2002).  Although other biases have been identified, these 
represent some of the most common examples of cognitive short-cut processes that 
influence decision making.      
There is some evidence to suggest that the use of heuristics can be functional by 
increasing the efficiency of decision making, especially compared to the use of an 
algorithm (Beckman & Kuhl, 1984).  “An algorithm is a specific rule or solution 
procedure, often detailed and complex, that is guaranteed to furnish the correct answer if 
it is followed correctly” (Ashcraft, 2002, p. 464).  However, whereas an algorithm is 
theoretically error free, it is often not the most efficient approach to problem solving, 
whereas heuristics tend to be much more efficient.  Nevertheless, cognitive heuristics are 
fallible, and as noted by Garb, (2003) they can lead clinicians to fail to learn from their 
clinical experience.  Heuristics allow people to make judgments efficiently and at times 
accurately, however, they also have the potential to lead to errors in judgment (Garb, 
2003).  Whereas a heuristic is a cognitive short-cut and may or may not lead to error in 
decision making, biases often stem from the use of these cognitive short-cuts, which then 
lead to errors. 
As mentioned above, biases are often specific types of heuristics.  One of the most 
common examples is the availability heuristic.  This refers to the tendency to be 
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influenced by the ease with which individuals remember situations or aspects of 
situations.  Biases that can potentially stem from the availability heuristic are biases in 
general world knowledge, familiarity biases, and salience and vividness biases.  Other 
heuristics identified by Ashcraft (2002) include the representativeness heuristic and the 
simulation heuristic.  “The representativeness heuristic is a judgment rule in which an 
estimate of the probability of an event is determined by one of two features: how similar 
the event is to the population of events it came from or whether the event seems similar 
to the process that produced it” (Ashcraft, 2002, p.468).  One bias that may stem from 
this heuristic is a stereotype.  Another is the gambler’s fallacy (thinking that the next toss 
of a coin is more likely to be either heads or tails based on the previous tosses, when 
really the previous tosses have no effect on the next).  Finally, the simulation heuristic 
refers to a “mental construction or imagining of outcomes, a forecasting of how some 
event will turn out or how it might have turned out under another set of circumstances” 
(Ashcraft, 2002, p. 475).  The most common bias that stems from this heuristic is the 
hindsight bias described above.  
Although there are many biases and heuristics, Nickerson (1998) wrote that “if 
one were to attempt to identify a single problematic aspect of human reasoning that 
deserves attention above all others, the confirmation bias would have to be among the 
candidates for consideration” (p. 175).  He asserts that the confirmation bias appears to be 
pervasive enough that it may by itself account for a significant number of the disputes 
and misunderstanding that occur among individuals, groups, and even nations.   
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The Confirmation Bias 
The confirmation bias has been studied in a wide array of contexts and situations 
(Frey & Thelen, 2001; Garb, 2003; Huebner, 1990; Loslowski & Maqueda, 1993; 
Nickerson, 1998; Snyder & Campbell, 1980).  As Nickerson (1998) defines it, the 
confirmation bias, as the term is typically used in the psychological literature, connotes 
the seeking or interpreting of evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs, 
expectations, or a hypothesis in hand.  Whereas the confirmation bias is studied in a wide 
variety of contexts, it is most often studied by social psychologists.   
Wason (1960) developed a task that asks subjects to discover a rule that 
determines which of a series of three-number strings were correct and which were 
incorrect (Gorman & Gorman, 1984).  Subjects started with the number string ‘2-4-6’ and 
were informed that this string was “correct.”  They were then asked to generate different 
number strings.  After each string, they were told whether it was correct or incorrect.  
When they believed that they had discovered the rule, they would announce their 
hypothesis.  For example, “numbers increasing in order of magnitude.”  After hearing 
many of his subject’s responses, Wason discovered that many of his subjects displayed a 
strong confirmation bias and neglected to use disconfirmatory testing strategies.  
Replicating his findings were Mahoney & DeMonbreun (1978) who found that when 
testing psychologists with this task, all groups showed a tendency to confirm their 
hypotheses rather than disconfirm.  Based on these studies using Wason’s task (1960), 
subjects are much more likely to use confirmatory strategies than disconfirmatory 
strategies unless told to do otherwise.  
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In one famous study, Snyder Tanke and Berscheid (1977) investigated the 
confirmation bias in social interactions and assessed the belief that physically attractive 
people have more appealing personalities than less physically attractive people.  College 
age men were given a picture of their assigned partner before talking with them over the 
phone.  The men who believed that their partner was physically attractive had 
expectations that they would be socially adept, and therefore conversed in a more warm 
and friendly way than men who believed that their partner was unattractive.  The women 
then responded in a similar manner (whether they were physically attractive or not).  In 
addition, women who were thought to be less attractive were thought to be aloof during 
the phone conversation.   
In another study by Snyder and Swann, (1978), the confirmation bias was 
investigated with respect to testing hypotheses about others.  Each student was given a 
“target person” and told that this person was either introverted or extroverted.  They were 
asked to test this idea by selecting questions to ask their target person.  Results showed 
that the students tested their hypotheses in a confirmatory way by asking questions that 
would elicit either extroverted or introverted behavior.  That is, they acted as if their 
hypotheses were truth, rather than as an idea to be tested.   In summary, these results 
suggest that the confirmation bias can alter social interactions as well as influence the 
testing of hypotheses about others.   
In another study by Fugelsang, Stein, Green and Dunbar, (2004), the confirmation 
bias was evidenced in an observation study.  Three leading molecular biology 
laboratories at a prominent U.S. university were analyzed.  One researcher interviewed 
the scientists and attended the laboratory meetings which were audiotaped and 
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transcribed.  They were then coded along a number of dimensions, including the types of 
interactions between speakers such as clarification, agreement and elaboration, 
disagreement, and questioning.  First, the researchers found that participants discounted 
data that was inconsistent with their initial theory as not being “real” however, over time, 
they found that participants altered their approach and began to consider information that 
was inconsistent with their initial hypothesis and to modify that hypothesis to account for 
the new information.  This study provides further support for the existence of the 
confirmation bias, although, it extends a step further to include the notion that the 
confirmatory strategies that are often used initially may dissipate with time and repeated 
experience when the data does not fit the initial hypothesis.   
          This phenomenon not only occurs in social or laboratory contexts, however, and 
awareness of the confirmation bias is of particular importance within the clinical context.  
Every time clinicians interact with their clients they have the opportunity to gather 
information and form new or different impressions.  Clinicians often form these 
impressions through several means.  Clinicians may form impressions based on the 
verbal content of their clients’ comments, the paralinguistic features such as tone of voice 
or voice volume, or their clients’ nonverbal behaviors such as body posture, facial 
expression, etc.  In addition, these observations are often made simultaneously and very 
quickly (Elstein, Shulman & Sprafka, 1978; Guaron & Dickinson, 1969; Sandifer, 
Hordern & Green, 1970).  As an example, the impression formation literature in social 
psychology attends to how individuals get to know others and how people often make 
inferences about the characteristics or traits of people in a brief amount of time.  Whereas 
this may be a useful strategy as it allows people to get beyond the specific behavior of an 
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individual and generalize to similar events in the future (Van Overwalle & Labiouse, 
2004), it may also lead clinicians to form inaccurate and premature impressions.  This can 
be problematic because once an initial diagnostic impression is formed, it can be very 
difficult to alter this impression. (Elstein, et al., 1978; Guaron & Dickinson, 1969; 
Oskamp, 1965; Sandifer,et al., 1970).  However, clients typically do not seek treatment 
for one session only and they may be exhibiting behaviors over subsequent sessions that 
are inconsistent with the clinician’s initial diagnosis.  If the clinician is influenced by the 
confirmation bias, he or she may search for information consistent with his or her original 
impression, and disregard subsequent inconsistent information.    
 Eva (2003) also found that participants in a medical diagnostic study were prone 
to the confirmation bias and results revealed that diagnosticians did not seriously consider 
alternative diagnoses when they were not explicitly asked to evaluate them.  Even when 
subjects were given direction to “consider alternatives,” they continued to focus on their 
initial hypothesis, despite evidence to the contrary. 
 Another study by Jonas, Schulz-Hardt and Frey (2001) supports this idea.  These 
researchers found that the way in which information is presented greatly influenced 
whether the participants demonstrated the confirmation bias.  That is, they found that 
participants are more prone to the confirmation bias when information was presented and 
processed sequentially instead of simultaneously.  The authors hypothesize that this 
increase in the confirmation bias was due to the heightened commitment that participants 
made to their initial hypotheses when the information was provided sequentially.  This 
study provides useful information as to how the confirmation bias may unfold, and may 
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hold important implications for gathering as much data as possible and reserving 
decision-making until all of the data is collected.    
In addition to the short amount of time it takes clinicians to make their initial 
judgments of clients, another problem is the amount of information that clients reveal 
during the first session.  There is a great deal of information for a client to reveal to their 
therapist and often, it is not possible for the client to reveal all of the information in the 
first session due to lack of time.  In addition, the client may want to develop a strong 
rapport with the therapist before they will reveal highly personal information.  This alone 
is not necessarily problematic.  However, it does become problematic when a therapist 
makes an initial impression and then disregards inconsistent information in later sessions.  
Clearly, the confirmation bias should be of concern to clinicians, as accuracy in diagnosis 
is an essential first step in treatment.   
The Confirmation Bias and Psychiatric Diagnosis 
Some research shows that when a client is assessed, diagnostic impressions are 
typically made very quickly and it is often difficult to set aside these initial impressions 
to allow for new and or inconsistent information to be considered (Guaron & Dickenson, 
1969; Houts & Galante, 1985; Langer & Abelson, 1974; Sandifer, et al., 1970; Temerlin, 
1968).  Herbert, Nelson, and Herbert, (1988) examined how a diagnosis assigned to a 
client affects the accuracy of the assessment of normal and abnormal behaviors that were 
either consistent or inconsistent with the initial diagnosis.  Practicing clinical 
psychologists were randomly assigned to two groups, one of which was told that the 
clients they were about to see had been diagnosed with Dysthymic Disorder at a local 
clinic, and the other of which was not provided a diagnostic label.  The psychologists 
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then watched 12-minute videotapes of three clients.  Each psychologist observed a client 
displaying “normal” behavior, another displaying symptoms characteristic of Dysthymic 
Disorder, and a third displaying symptoms characteristic of a Major Depressive Episode.  
The results revealed that the assessment of normal behaviors exhibited by clients was 
impaired by the label they received.  In other words, when given a diagnosis of 
“Dysthymia,” psychologists were more likely to diagnose a normal “client” with 
Dysthymia than when no such label was given.  This is but one example of how the 
confirmation bias can affect clinical judgment.  
One of the most famous studies relating to the clinical effects of the confirmation 
bias was conducted by Rosenhan and his colleagues in 1973.  Eight pseudo-patients 
checked themselves into a mental hospital complaining of schizophrenic like symptoms, 
specifically, they complained of hearing voices.  They then behaved as they normally 
would and did not present with any additional psychotic symptoms.  However, what they 
found was that most of their actions were interpreted as being abnormal.  The effect of 
the initial judgment of pathology here is powerful as the normal behaviors exhibited 
subsequently were either ignored or reinterpreted to be those of someone who was 
mentally ill, reflecting the confirmation bias.   
 Langer and Abelson (1974) studied the effects of labels on clinicians’ judgments.  
Both behavior and psychoanalytic therapists viewed a videotaped interview between a 
man who had just applied for a job and one of the authors.  Half of each group was told 
that the interviewee was a job applicant, and the other half was told that he was a patient.  
All clinicians were then asked to complete a questionnaire to evaluate the interview.  The 
behavior therapists described the interviewee as “well adjusted” regardless of the label 
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they were given.  However, the psychoanalytic therapists judged the interviewee as more 
disturbed when they were told that he was a patient rather than a job applicant.  This is 
another example of the confirmation bias, as the interviewee’s “normal” behaviors were 
reinterpreted to fit the initial idea that he was a patient.  The authors offer several 
interpretations.  There is the possibility that the interviewee did have deep underlying 
problems about which the behavior therapists were unaware of; however, because the 
interviewee was able to cope with his environment and was not really a patient, the 
authors were not satisfied with this interpretation.  They also suggest that it is possible 
that the behavior therapists were so focused on the behaviors of the interviewee that the 
label did not affect them.  The authors believe that the most likely explanation is that the 
behavior therapists noted the label and actively tried to discount its relevance because 
training from a cognitive perspective encourages such discounting.  
 In yet another labeling study, Temerlin (1968) studied the suggestion effect in 
psychiatric diagnosis.  He investigated the interpersonal influences that may influence 
diagnostic decision making.  Psychiatrists, clinical psychologists, and graduate students 
in clinical psychology listened to an audiotaped interview of a “normal, healthy man.”  
They then offered a diagnosis.  Prior to listening to the interview, each subject heard a 
highly prestigious clinician say that the individual was “a very interesting man because 
he looked neurotic but was actually was quite psychotic.”  They found that the subjects’ 
diagnoses were influenced by the presence of the label “psychotic”.  No subjects in the 
control condition diagnosed the individual with psychosis, whereas a diagnosis of 
psychosis was made by 60 percent of the psychiatrists.  Temerlin’s work indicates that 
the confirmation bias affected the subjects’ impressions and potentially altered their 
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interpretation of his behaviors, leading them to interpret his “normal, healthy” behaviors 
as psychotic.       
Making the process of diagnosis even more complicated is the work of Arkes and 
Harkness (1980), who found that the very act of making a diagnosis changes the way that 
a clinician remembers the case.  They found that a clinician is more likely to remember a 
symptom that is consistent with their diagnosis, even if the client did not present with that 
symptom.  
Clearly, the assessments made by these clinicians were influenced by the presence 
of a label.  Not only did the label “psychotic” influence the clinicians, but merely the 
understanding that an interviewee was a “patient” influenced the clinicians to interpret 
normal behaviors as abnormal.  Again, this is of concern for clinicians who may be 
interpreting the behavior of their clients in an abnormal way, without objectively 
considering their behaviors.  Whereas these studies focus primarily on labeling, they 
relate to the confirmation bias in that the confirmation bias may stem from the presence 
of a label.  As an example, if a clinician assessing a patient finds that a previous therapist 
labeled the patient as depressed, the new therapist may be affected by the presence of the 
label and form hypotheses consistent with that label.  He or she may then judge the 
patient’s behaviors to be consistent with someone who is depressed and may also 
disregard behaviors that are inconsistent with the label and miss important diagnostic 
information.  Whereas these studies have indicated the importance of the confirmation 
bias with respect to psychodiagnosis, the following studies relate to the confirmation bias 
in more general clinical contexts.   
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The Confirmation Bias in the Clinical Context 
 Although the previously mentioned studies are of importance to clinicians, the 
focus of these studies was on the labeling effects of a diagnosis, and the subsequent 
confirmation bias that may result from a label.  However, there are several studies 
investigating the confirmation bias more directly within the clinical context.  Haverkamp, 
(1993) assessed the responses of 65 counseling trainees after they viewed a videotape of a 
therapeutic interaction.  The hypothesis testing strategies of the trainees were assessed 
using hypotheses provided by the client.  The hypothesis testing strategies were also 
assessed for those hypotheses generated by the counselor.  The trainees were asked to 
generate a list of questions they would like to ask the client.  In assessing these questions, 
the results suggested that their style of hypothesis testing was confirmatory.  Questions 
were confirmatory 64% of the time, (meaning that their questions focused on confirming 
their hypotheses, rather then refuting them), neutral 21% of the time, and disconfirmatory 
15% of the time.  This strongly suggests the presence of the confirmation bias with 
respect to hypothesis testing.  Similarly, Snyder and Swann, (1978) found that students 
tested their hypotheses in a confirmatory manner.  Students were told that a “target 
person” was either introverted or extroverted.  The students then asked questions of this 
target person, and results showed that the students tested their hypotheses in a 
confirmatory manner by asking questions that would elicit either an extroverted or 
introverted answer.   
 Whereas the confirmation bias has been shown to affect the style of hypothesis 
testing, Guaron and Dickenson (1969) studied the confirmation bias in relation to the 
amount of time it takes clinicians to make a diagnosis.  They conducted a study in which 
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psychiatrists were asked to watch videotaped interviews and to give a diagnosis based on 
their observations. Results indicated that many of the psychiatrists made a diagnosis 
within 30-60 seconds of watching these videotapes.  Additionally, after the initial 
diagnosis was made, the psychiatrists did not change their diagnostic impression even 
when contradictory information was given.  These psychiatrists were told that they would 
first watch a videotape of a patient and then would complete a Patient Evaluation Form, 
following which they would be asked to make a diagnosis.  At the time that the 
psychiatrists made a diagnosis, they were asked to provide ratings of the likelihood of the 
diagnosis and their satisfaction with the diagnosis they provided.  After this, they were 
asked to report what items of information were most important in making the diagnosis.  
The examiner then explained that information pertaining to the patient had since been 
obtained and the examiner read aloud to the subject that piece of information from the 
case history categories that most closely approximated the informational item rated of 
greatest importance.  This continued until the entire list had been covered.  The subjects 
were then asked to make a final diagnosis.  Results showed that the psychiatrists did not 
actively seek out disconfirming information, which likely led them not to consider 
changing their initial diagnoses, suggestive of the confirmation bias.  The psychiatrists 
either ignored the disconfirming information, or reinterpreted the new information to fit 
with their initial diagnostic impression. 
 Similar to the results of Guaron and Dickinson (1969), Sandifer, Hordern and 
Green (1970) found that clinicians make judgments and diagnoses very quickly and may 
not consider additional information.  They investigated diagnostic decision making by 
having psychiatrists watch films of diagnostic interviews.  They then asked them to 
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record their observations while watching the film.  They found that the first three minutes 
of observation have a significant and sometimes decisive impact on the final diagnosis.  
This again suggests the presence of the confirmation bias because clinicians in this study 
made diagnostic decisions very quickly and appeared to disregard additional information 
once their initial impression was formed.    
 These results are consistent with the work of Elstein, Shulman and Sprafka 
(1978), who found that clinicians formed diagnostic impressions very early in the 
assessment process.  They also found that the most accurate clinicians arrived at a final 
diagnosis later than those who were less accurate.  This research further supports the 
notion that the confirmation bias is not only present within the clinical context, but also 
suggests that it affects the accuracy of diagnostic impressions. 
 In 1965, Oskamp conducted a study investigating the effects of the confirmatory 
bias and overconfidence in clinical decision making. The relationship among incremental 
data gathering, validity of personality judgments and the confidence in the accuracy of 
these judgments was assessed.  As additional information was presented to the clinicians, 
confidence in their accuracy of the personality judgments increased.  Interestingly, 
accuracy remained at the same level while confidence continued to rise.  One possible 
explanation is that overconfidence causes clinicians to focus on information that confirms 
their hypotheses and to ignore or reinterpret disconfirming evidence.   
 Another study investigating the confirmation bias and clinician confidence within 
the therapy session found similar results.  Martin (2001) conducted a study in which 
mock therapy clients participated in a clinical interview.  The clinicians were asked for 
their diagnosis and confidence rating, in addition to listing questions that they wished to 
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ask to clarify their hypothesis.  Over time, participants became more confirmatory and 
less disconfirmatory in their questioning of the pseudo-client.  In addition, those who 
used more disconfirmatory questioning strategies were less confident in their diagnoses 
than were those who used confirmatory strategies.   
 This overconfidence can be especially important with regard to clinical versus 
statistical prediction research.  In the process of making clinical judgments, therapists 
tend to ignore base rate information and assume that their clinical judgment is more 
accurate than statistical predictions.  However, this is usually not the case.  Paul Meehl 
(1957) asserts that the evidence for the superiority of actuarial prediction is far too 
convincing to ignore.  Studies investigating clinical vs. statistical prediction on 
everything from medical diagnosis to sports suggests that neither is highly reliable, 
however clinical prediction is far less reliable (Meehl, 1957; Stanovich, 2001).  This 
inaccuracy in clinical prediction is potentially hazardous in the clinical setting.  If 
clinicians are affected by the confirmation bias and their overconfidence leads them to 
disregard inconsistent information such as base rate information, this makes it even less 
likely that a clinician will consider alternative diagnoses.  In other words, if clinicians are 
overconfident and ignore base rate information, assuming that their clinical judgment is 
more accurate than statistical predictions, the effects of any confirmation bias could be 
magnified. 
 The studies discussed here suggest that the confirmation bias affects several 
aspects of the therapeutic process.  Haverkamp (1993) found that the style of hypothesis 
testing was confirmatory most of the time and only disconfirmatory 15% of the time.  
The questions asked of clients were not the only confirmatory practice, however.  Gauron 
                                                                                                             Effects of the Confirmation Bias          62
& Dickenson (1969), Elstein et al. (1978), and Sandifer, et al. (1970) found that 
diagnostic impressions are made very early on during the clinical interview, sometimes 
within the first 30 seconds, and additional information was subsequently ignored.  
Finally, Oskamp (1965) reports that overconfidence may cause clinicians to focus on 
information that confirms their hypotheses and either to ignore or to reinterpret 
information that might disconfirm their hypotheses.  Clearly, the confirmation bias 
affects several aspects of the diagnostic decision making process.     
 Real-World Importance of Addressing the Confirmation Bias 
The studies discussed above are alarming, and illustrate the need for the 
development of assessment practices designed to counteract powerful cognitive biases 
that impact clinical decision making.  These studies are clear examples of how biases and 
heuristics, especially the confirmation bias, apply to the clinical realm.  One example of 
how biases impact real world decision making is a study of Schizophrenia among African 
Americans.  Research has shown that clinicians are more likely to assign a diagnosis of 
Schizophrenia to an African American client than to a Caucasian client (Neighbors, 
Trierweiler, Ford & Muroff, 2003; Trierweiler, Neighbors, Munday, Thompson, Binion 
& Gomez, 2000).  There are other explanations for the difference in diagnostic rates, 
including differences in presentation across cultures, and the possibility that there really 
are differences in the rates of psychiatric disorders between races (Trierweiler et al., 
2000).  However, biases, such as the race bias, have been found in addition to these 
explanations.  Clearly, if clinicians are expecting that African Americans have a higher 
rate of Schizophrenia and they look for consistent symptoms, this is another example of 
how the confirmation bias can potentially affect clients in a negative way.   
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The confirmation bias is important for clinicians to be aware of for many reasons.  
Consider, for example, the scenario in which a therapist believes that symptoms such as 
feelings of depression, shame, worthlessness, perfectionism, and powerlessness are 
suggestive of previous sexual abuse.  Authors such as Ellen Bass and Laura Davis, 
authors of the highly popular Courage to Heal (1988), suggest that survivors of sexual 
abuse are highly likely to experience such symptoms.  Therefore, when a client reports 
these feelings, and her therapist suggests that she may have been sexually abused, this is 
another subtler example of the confirmation bias.  Loftus (1998) and McNally (2001) 
have found that even if a patient cannot remember any abuse, some suggest that it 
nevertheless occurred, and they she simply repressed the memory.  Through the use of 
guided imagery, hypnosis, or dream interpretation, therapists have searched for 
information that confirms their hypotheses.  Once the therapist finds some information 
believed to be consistent with sexual abuse, this only strengthens his or her hypothesis, 
and as previous studies have shown (Gauron & Dickinson, 1969; Haverkamp, 1993), 
therapists rarely look for disconfirming evidence without being prompted to do so.  
Within this context, the confirmation bias has led to false memories in clients, while 
therapists believe they have revealed what were previously repressed memories.  The 
harm done by so-called “recovered memory therapy” includes the severing of 
relationships with between clients and their fathers, uncles, and other innocent friends 
and family members.  Several researchers including Loftus (1998, 2003) and McNally 
(2001, 2003) have refuted the research on recovered memories; however, some therapists 
continue to rely on the confirmation bias and actively search out these “repressed 
memories.”    
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The previous studies demonstrate how the confirmation bias has the potential to 
impact clinical decision making in a negative way.  Knowing this, several researchers 
have attempted to “debias” subjects through a number of strategies.  Instead of merely 
investigating whether biases exist, these researchers use several strategies in an attempt to 
actively decreased bias.  
Strategies for Debiasing 
The studies discussed above suggest that biases, especially the confirmation bias, 
are clearly problematic for clinicians.  Therefore, several researchers have attempted to 
“debias” subjects through a variety of strategies including (a) the use of structure clinical 
interviews, (b) decreasing overconfidence, (c) delaying decision making, (d) training, (e) 
considering the opposite, (f) considering alternatives, and (g) education or warning the 
subject about the bias (Arkes, Christensen, Lai & Blumer, 1987; Eva, 2003; Galinsky & 
Moskowitz, 2000; Hirt & Markman, 1995; Lord, Pepper & Preston, 1984; Mumma & 
Steven, 1995; Mynatt, Doherty & Tweney, 1978; Newstead, Pollard, Evans & Allen, 
1992; Renner & Renner, 2001; Spengler, Strohmer, Dixon & Shivy, 1995).  One of the 
most common strategies is to educate or warn someone about a bias and suggest they be 
aware of it while performing their respective tasks.   Although this is a common 
approach, the research is somewhat contradictory with regard to the effectiveness of 
warning a subject about a potential bias.  Some argue that it is worthless (Arkes, 1981), 
however many others have found that educating or warning subjects is an effective means 
to combat biases.   
Structured Clinical Interviews.  Whaley and Geller, (2007, in press) discuss 
cognitive biases within two models of information processing.  The first is cognitive bias 
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stemming from prototype models of information processing.  The other incorporates the 
structured clinical interview to assess the decision making process.  Specifically, they 
address racial biases and misdiagnoses of African Americans.  They suggest that 
comprehensive training in the administration of the Structured Clinical Interview for the 
DSM-IV (First, Spitzer, Gibbon &Williams, 1996) is a key component in decreasing these 
biases, although they also acknowledge that accurate diagnosis requires knowledge of 
variability in symptoms presentation between different cultures and ethnic groups. 
Perspective Taking.  Galinsky and Moskowitz (2000) investigated perspective 
taking as a debiasing technique for stereotypes.  Subjects were shown a black and white 
photograph of an older man sitting next to a news stand.  Subjects were then asked to 
write a short essay about a typical day in his life.  Before writing the essay, one third of 
the subjects were assigned to a control condition and received no further instructions.  
One third were assigned to a supression condition and told that they should try to avoid 
thinking about the photograph when writing their essays.  The final third were instructed 
to adopt the perspective of the man and imagine a day in the life of this individual.  
Subjects then completed a lexical decision task and after this, they were shown a picture 
of a second elderly man and asked to write a second essay.  Finally, subjects were shown 
a picture of an African American male in his early twenties and asked to write one final 
essay.  Results from the essays showed that perspective taking successfully decreased 
stereotypic biases, as subjects’ essays did not include information about stereotypes.  This 
research holds important implications for clinicians who knowingly or unknowingly are 
biased by their clients’ race.  As Trierweiler et al. (2000) and Neighbors et al. (2000) 
found, the race bias is a very real concern for clinicians. 
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Computerized Programs.  Silverman (1992) investigated whether computers can 
interact with subjects through modeling and detecting their confirmation biases during a 
problem solving task.  He investigated whether computers can have an effect on 
decreasing the confirmation bias by offering criticism in response to the subject’s use of 
the confirmation bias.  The results of his work suggest that computers likely can decrease 
the use of the confirmation bias, although the improvement is sensitive to the strategy 
used.  The results suggest that the most successful strategy was the use of an “influencer” 
that tutors subjects about the confirmation bias with an example before they attempt the 
task.  This is similar to the work on educating subjects before starting a task.  These 
results suggest that offering a warning about the confirmation bias along with an example 
can be an effective debiasing strategy.  
Decreasing Overconfidence.  Arkes, Christensen, Lai, and Blumer (1987) 
attempted to reduce overconfidence using two strategies across two different 
experiments.  In experiment one, half of the subjects answered five practice questions 
that appeared to be difficult.  The remaining subjects answered questions that appeared to 
be easy, but were just as difficult as the other questions.  Half of each group received 
feedback on the accuracy of their answers, whereas the other half received no feedback.  
All four groups then answered an additional 30 questions, and rated their confidence in 
their answers.  The group that thought they were answering easy questions and then 
received feedback became less confident in their answers on the last 30 questions.  
Subjects in a second experiment anticipated a group discussion of their answers after they 
completed answering all questions.  Not surprisingly, these subjects took a longer amount 
of time to answer their questions and were less confident than a control group.  Koriat, 
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Lichtenstein and Fischhoff (1980) suggest that one reason for overconfidence is that 
subjects can more easily generate supporting reasons for their decisions compared to 
contradictory reasons.  Therefore, if the evidence that people are likely to retrieve is 
supportive of their hypotheses rather than representative of all available evidence, 
confidence increases.  This process again reflects the confirmation bias, as people will 
seek out confirmatory evidence (thereby increasing confidence) and disregard 
disconfirmatory evidence.   
Koriat, et al. (1980) suggest two strategies for decreasing overconfidence.  In one 
experiment subjects were given two alternative questions and were required to list 
reasons for and against each of the alternatives before choosing an answer and assessing 
the likelihood of its being correct.  This decreased confidence to a much more appropriate 
level.  In a second experiment, subjects were asked first to choose an answer and then to 
list (a) one reason supporting that choice, (b) one reason contradicting it, or (c) one 
reason supporting and one reason contradicting it.  In this study, they found that the only 
group that was able to accurately rate confidence was the group that listed contradicting 
reasons.   
Renner and Renner (2001) assessed whether decreasing overconfidence can be 
done in a classroom setting, as well as whether this has practical value for students.  They 
found that providing confidence estimates as questions were answered was enough to 
debias students in a series of quizzes and resulted in better performance on quizzes.  In a 
second experiment, quizzes were taken on a computer.  Students were given feedback for 
each question as it was answered.  Again, results indicated that overconfidence decreased 
and students performed better on the quizzes.      
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The results of several studies indicate that decreasing overconfidence is an 
effective means of debiasing subjects.  Given the relationship of overconfidence and the 
confirmation bias, this may also hold important implications for debiasing subjects who 
are using confirmation bias.  That is, decreasing overconfidence may also lead to a 
reduction in the confirmation bias. 
Delayed Decision Making.  Spengler, Strohmer Dixon and Shivy (1995) 
investigated the effects of delaying judgment on the accuracy of diagnosis.  They found 
that when therapists delay final judgments, they have the time to reflect on and even 
extend the assessment.  In addition, therapists were able to test alternative hypotheses, 
and subsequently became more open to alternative explanations.  In addition, Elstein, 
Shulman and Sprafka (1978) found that the most accurate clinicians arrived at a final 
diagnosis later than those who were less accurate.  Based on this work, Hill & Ridley 
(2001) investigated whether counselors put this debiasing technique into practice.  That 
is, do they delay their diagnostic impressions when in a setting that allows them to do so, 
without pressure from insurance companies to submit a diagnosis right away?  Results 
suggested that delayed diagnostic decision making occurred more frequently than 
immediate diagnostic decision making.  They are unsure if these results can be 
generalized, due to the small number of participants, and the fact that the counselors were 
all still in training.  Because of the inconsistency with other studies finding that clinicians 
make judgments very quickly (e.g., Elstein, et al., 1978; Guaron & Dickenson, 1969; 
Sandifer, Hordern & Green, 1970) it may be that these students were recently trained to 
avoid a premature diagnosis until they believed they had acquired a sufficient amount of 
information.  Nevertheless, this appears to be a useful debiasing technique for clinicians, 
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as Spengler, et al., (1995) found that delaying final judgments increased the accuracy of 
diagnosis, and Hill and Ridley, (2001) found that clinicians were in fact able to 
implement this technique.    
Considering the Opposite.  Lord, Pepper, and Preston (1984) investigated the 
notion that considering the opposite (beliefs, perceptions, outcomes, etc.), would lead 
subjects to display less bias in social judgment.  In two experiments, they found that the 
introduction of a “consider the opposite” strategy had a stronger corrective effect than 
giving general debiasing instructions to “be as fair and unbiased as possible.”  They 
believe that this is an effective method for retraining biases in social judgment.  These 
results support the notion that a general statement about avoiding bias does not work, 
although the general statement they used did not attempt to educate subjects about any 
one bias in particular or provide examples of when and how biases interfere with decision 
making.   
Mumma and Steven (1995) used the “consider the opposite” strategy as well in an 
attempt to decrease the primacy effect (also known as the anchoring effect) in clinical 
judgment.  They found that a “consider the opposite” procedure, involving cue sorting by 
diagnosis, decreased the primacy effect.  However, they also found that a “bias 
inoculation” procedure also reduced the primacy effect.  However, the bias inoculation 
training involved more than simply informing subjects about the bias and warning them 
against it.  This approach involved more detailed and consistent training throughout the 
task.   
Training.  The approach used by Mumma and Steven (1995) involved informing 
subjects about the primacy effect, and why it may occur.  They were then given an 
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example demonstrating how they might adjust for the primacy effect and practiced this 
several times.  Each trial involved a description of a person who made a personality 
judgment about someone after receiving an initial set and a subsequent set of cues about 
them.  The subject was asked to indicate how the initial judgment should have been 
adjusted to avoid the anchoring bias.  Subjects who gave incorrect answers to a scenario 
were corrected, and given an explanation for why they were incorrect.  The trials were 
then repeated.  Mumma and Steven found this to be marginally successful in decreasing 
the primacy effect.  They suggest incorporating specific or non-specific debiasing 
strategies into clinical training so that they become a routine component in the process of 
assessment and diagnosis.   
Considering Alternatives.  Hirt and Markman (1995) propose that considering 
any plausible alternatives, not just the opposite as suggested by Lord et al. (1984), will 
also lead to debiased judgments.  They recognize that there are instances in which only 
two alternatives can be considered.  However, very often, as with the case of 
psychodiagnosis, there are many alternatives.  Subjects in this study (students at Indiana 
University) were told that the experiment would investigate how well subjects are able to 
discover relationships between personality traits and behavior.  Participants were asked to 
explain either one hypothetical outcome or two hypothetical outcomes for a particular 
event.  The results suggested that debiasing occurred in all multiple explanation 
conditions, not only those that involved one opposite outcome.  The results support their 
hypotheses that considering any alternative may be a useful debiasing tool.  This may 
have important implications for the clinical realm, as there are many alternative 
explanations or diagnoses rather than just one opposite alternative explanation.  
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Slovic and Fischhoff (1977) found that the hindsight bias could be reduced when 
people were forced to consider how the results of a research study could have otherwise 
turned out.  They investigated whether there is a difference between the perceptions of 
those in a foresight condition relative to a hindsight condition.  That is, some subjects 
were asked to consider alternatives to a hypothetical outcome whereas others were asked 
to consider alternatives to an already existing outcome.  They found that both groups 
were able to consider alternatives, suggesting that asking subjects to consider alternatives 
leads to a decrease in the hindsight bias, both prior to and after a particular outcome.   
Gorman and Gorman (1984) investigated the effects of group decision making 
using the Wason (1960) task.  Three groups were evaluated: (a) confirmatory, (b) 
disconfirmatory, and (c) a control group.  They found that subjects in the disconfirmatory 
condition predicted and obtained a significantly higher proportion of incorrect strings and 
tested significantly more of their hypotheses with a string they predicted would be 
incorrect than did subjects in other conditions, suggesting the benefit of instructions to 
search for disconfirming information. 
Gorman, Gorman, Latta and Cunningham (1984) also assessed the effectiveness 
of confirmation and disconfirmation instructions.  Their study involved the use of the 
card game “New Eleusis” which is “designed to simulate the scientific, mathematical or 
metaphysical search for truth” (Gorman & Gorman, 1984).  In playing this game, subjects 
were instructed to determine a rule that governs how the cards can be played.  Subjects 
were randomly assigned to one of three groups: (a) disconfirmatory, (b) confirmatory, or 
(c) a mixed group using elements of both.  They found that the disconfirmatory group 
solved more of the rules than the other two groups.  They believe that the results are 
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explained by the increased number of attempts (of the disconfirmatory group) to search 
for disconfirming evidence, thereby falsifying their hypotheses.  These studies provide 
support for the notion that considering another perspective, namely the disconfirmatory 
perspective, allows subjects to solve the task. 
Education.  Whereas some believe that educating subjects about a bias is not a 
practical approach, others have found this approach to be highly effective (Arkes, 1981; 
Kurtz & Garfield, 1978; Mynatt, Doherty, & Tweney 1977; Tweney, Doherty, Worner, 
Pliske, Mynatt, Gross & Arkkelin, 1980).  Arkes (1981) argued that is it “absolutely 
worthless” to tell subjects what a particular bias is and tell them not to be influenced by 
it, citing one study by Kurtz and Garfield, (1978).  However, there are several other 
studies that offer evidence in support of education as a debiasing technique.   
Kurtz and Garfield (1978) investigated the illusory correlation and whether 
educating can have an effect on decreasing the illusory correlation.  Four groups of 15 
subjects were told that the authors needed the help of an untrained population to study 
basic patterns of test interpretation.  Thirty Rorschach cards were placed on 
transparencies along with one response that was paired with two statements about 
emotional problems of a supposed patient who allegedly had given that response.  Groups 
3 and 4 received special pre-training instructions, warning them against the illusory 
correlation.  Despite a warning to subjects in the experimental groups, the illusory 
correlation was not reduced.  The authors suggest that perhaps more intensive training 
with feedback and numerous examples may have a greater success in combating the 
hindsight bias.  They also suggest that the results may be due to a response bias that may 
have been embedded in the form of the questionnaire used.  For example, one question 
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states “Did you notice any kind of general thing that was seen most often by men with 
this problem?  If your answer is ‘yes’ name that kind of thing and give one example of 
that kind of thing.”  Clearly, the demand characteristic may have led subjects to think 
they should have something to list in response to this question, even if they did not truly 
see a correlation.  In addition, the authors suggest that perhaps the social pressure of 
working in a group setting with 15 students may have affected the responses.  For 
example, if some students are writing down responses, they may have thought that they 
too should find something to write down, even when they did not make an association 
themselves.  In addition, this study may not be generalizable to an individual clinician 
working with an individual client.   
Newstead, Pollard, Evans and Allen (1992), and Newstead, Allen, and Pollard 
(1994) studied the effects of instructions given to subjects aimed at avoiding the belief 
bias.  “The belief bias is the finding that people are more likely to accept the conclusion 
to a syllogism if they believe it than if they disbelieve it, irrespective of its actual logical 
validity” (Newstead, et al. 1992).  Taken together, the results of these studies suggest that 
the bias was reduced, although not completely eliminated.  However, the instructions 
used in this study warned subject to avoid bias in a general sense, without specifically 
addressing what the belief bias is.  In addition, they do not give examples of how one 
may fall prey to its effects or examples of how to avoid it.   
Mynatt, Doherty, and Tweney (1977) investigated whether subjects who received 
information about the importance of disconfirming evidence when solving a 
computerized task would evidence decreased use of the confirmation bias.  The task 
involved firing particles at several objects on a computer screen.  Subjects were randomly 
                                                                                                             Effects of the Confirmation Bias          74
assigned to one of three groups: (a) a control group, (b) a confirmatory group, or (c) a 
disconfirmatory group.  Interestingly, they discovered that when all groups received 
falsifying information, they recognized its significance and used it to solve the task.  
They also found that those subjects who used disconfirming strategies performed better 
than the remaining subjects.  However, they also discovered that when subjects had 
already begun to use the confirmation bias, it was difficult to decrease the bias, even 
when they were instructed to do so.  This suggests that perhaps addressing the effects of 
the confirmation bias prior to beginning a task may be more useful as an attempt to 
decrease bias.  
Mynatt, Doherty, and Tweney (1978) revised the computer task for another study, 
however the task was so difficult that no subject was able to solve it in the ten hours 
allotted to them.  Again, they found no differences between the disconfirmatory and 
control groups with regard to their understanding of the rules.  In some cases, subjects 
omitted disconfirmatory rules when they had misunderstood the experiment.  However, 
there were very few subjects in this experiment and given the difficulty of the task, 
results may not generalize to other problems solving tasks.   
In an attempt to use a more basic and established task, Tweney, Doherty, Worner, 
Pliske, Mynatt, Gross, and Arkkelin (1980) tested subjects using Wason’s (1960) task 
(discussed above).  They found that the group told to search for disconfirmatory 
information made many more attempts to falsify their hypotheses than those in a 
confirmatory group, suggesting that educating subjects about the confirmation bias was in 
fact successful during this task.   
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Whereas Arkes (1981) states that educating subjects about a bias is “worthless” 
there are several studies suggesting just the opposite.  Arkes (1981) cites a study by Kurtz 
and Garfield (1978) to support his statement; however, there are several problems with 
this study, including the presence of demand characteristics and group influence.  
Newstead et al. (1992) found a decrease in the belief bias when subjects were told to be 
aware of bias in a general sense.  That is, the subjects were not given information 
specifically about what the belief bias is and they were still able to decrease their bias.  
Mynatt, Doherty and Tweney (1977) found that subjects who received information about 
the importance of disconfirming evidence showed a decrease in their use of the 
confirmation bias.  Tweney, Doherty, and Worner et al. (1980) also found that educating 
subjects about the confirmation bias lead to a decrease in the bias.  Based on the results of 
these studies, it is clear that educating subjects about a bias can decrease the bias and 
therefore is not completely worthless, as Arkes (1981) believed. 
Additional Education Studies.  Still, other studies have investigated the 
effectiveness of educating subjects about a bias in an attempt to reduce that bias.  
Highhouse and Bottrill (1995) have found that people who were warned about other 
cognitive biases, such as the misinformation effect can resist the effect when warned.  
The misinformation effect occurs when misleading post-event information is remembered 
as having been part of an event.  They investigated the effects of misinformation on 
memory for behavioral information in an employment interview.  In an initial study, 
subjects watched a videotape of an employment interview, and then provided ratings of 
the interview.  They were then given evaluations made by others containing either 
misinformation, (mislead group) or no misinformation (control group).  They were told 
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that they should take this information into account with their own ratings to provide a 
group rating.  Finally, they completed a memory test of the tape.  Results showed that 
subjects in the mislead group were accepting of the misinformation and were confident 
that the misinformation was accurate.  The authors then conducted a follow-up 
experiment, in which other subjects received the same misinformation as the mislead 
group.  However, they were told that they had received some misinformation before they 
completed their memory test.  The results showed that this group was just as accurate as 
the control group.  They report that these results are interesting, especially given that the 
subjects report that a high level of confidence in their memories.  However the 
misinformation effects are explained, these studies suggest that when warned, subjects 
were able to resist the misinformation effects.     
In a similar study, Greene, Flynn, and Loftus (1982) found that as long as subjects 
were not primed to seek out misinformation, they would likely be accepting of this 
information.  They assessed 216 students participating in four experiments in an attempt 
to understand whether warning them about the possibility of future misinformation would 
lead to a more careful assessment of the information.  The results suggest that giving a 
subject warning about misinformation just before the misinformation is presented may 
lead to a more careful analysis of the information and result in a slightly greater 
resistance to the misinformation.  This study suggests that it may be possible to combat 
biases that clinicians use, potentially leading to more accurate diagnosis and assessment.  
These studies provide additional support for the effectiveness of educating subjects about 
a bias in an attempt to reduce that bias.   
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 Potential Errors Resulting from Debaising.  Wilson, Centerbar, and Brekke 
(2002) discuss the importance of debiasing, and the possible errors in judgment that can 
result from debiasing strategies.  They argue that when people are exposed to “mentally 
contaminating information,” (and are aware of it) they may make an attempt to correct 
for any known or unknown biases.  However, they argue that people are often not very 
successful in correcting for these biases.  They give the example of a hiker at a 
crossroads.  
There is a sign pointing toward one of the paths indicating that it leads to the 
hiker’s destination.  However, the hiker has been told that a mischievous boy 
often moves the sign so that it points in the wrong direction, and she has just seen 
a boy running away from the sign, laughing gleefully.  She is pretty sure that the 
sign is pointing to the wrong path (i.e., that it is “contaminated”), but how should 
she correct for this fact?  Given that the sign is pointing to the trail on the far left, 
should she take the one on the far right?  Of should she assume that the boy only 
had time to move the sign a little, and therefore take the middle trail?  Or that he 
is a clever boy who tried to convince her that he moved the sign, when in fact he 
did not? (p. 191).   
They argue that people who are exposed to “contaminating information” and engage in 
debiasing may not arrive at a similar conclusion to those who were not exposed.  They 
report finding three types of errors:  (a) insufficient correction (debiasing in the direction 
of accuracy that does not go far enough), (b) unnecessary correction (debiasing when 
there was no bias to start with), and (c) overcorrection (too much debiasing, so judgments 
end up biased in the opposite direction).  For example, Stapel, Martin and Schwartz 
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(1998) studied subjects’ ratings of the weather in tropical places and then rated the 
weather in Midwestern cities.  People in the experimental group, who rated the tropical 
locations first, and who were warned to avoid bias, overcorrected for their biases and 
rated the weather in the Midwestern cities as more desirable than the tropical locations.   
 In addition to providing suggestions to avoid bias, this study suggests that when 
warned about a potential bias, subjects may overcorrect under some conditions, or 
attempt to correct when there is no reason to, still leading to inaccurate judgments.  This 
suggests that certain debiasing strategies may be associated with their own inherent 
biases, and may not necessarily lead to more accurate judgments.  However, despite the 
unnecessary correction and overcorrection found in this study, several others have found 
that warning subjects about biases does lead to more accurate judgments (Mynatt, 
Doherty, & Tweney 1977; Tweney, Doherty & Worner, 1980).  One reason for this is 
that the study that found that subjects overcorrected for bias involved studying the 
subjects’ personal preferences.  In contrast, these studies did not find an overcorrection 
effect during a problem-solving task.  It may be that subjective preference is more easily 
swayed compared to evidence used during a problem-solving task.   
Whereas some research has shown that subjects may overcompensate for a bias 
when warned about the bias, others have shown that subjects reach more accurate 
conclusions when educated about a bias.  Despite the overcompensation effect found in 
several studies, education appears to be a potentially useful tool to use when attempting 
to decrease bias.  
 Many strategies have been offered in an effort to reduce cognitive biases.  These 
include; (a) taking another’s perspective, (b) use of computerized programs, (c) 
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decreasing overconfidence, (d) delaying decision making, (e) considering the opposite, 
(f) training, (g) considering alternatives, and finally, (h) educating subjects about biases 
and warning them not to succumb to their effects.  Of particular interest in the present 
study are the attempts to debias through the use of educating subjects about a bias prior to 
undertaking a task.  Based on the studies discussed above, education appears to be the 
most generally promising approach to debiasing subjects.  Whereas some studies did not 
find a high success level, many others did find a decrease in bias.  In addition, education 
is of particular relevance because of its high level of practical utility, as it does not 
involve extensive training or elaborate procedures.  Subjects can simply be told about the 
bias, without any excessive training on how to avoid the bias or how to correct for it.  
This may be especially true for educating subjects in a clinical setting.  A therapist may 
need merely to remind him or herself about bias before meeting with a client in order to 
decrease the effects of the bias. 
Based on the studies reviewed, the results suggest that education is an effective 
way to decrease bias.  In addition, the relationship between overconfidence and the 
confirmation bias is of interest, as some studies have shown that simply asking subjects 
to rate their confidence level leads to a more accurate level of confidence, and a decrease 
in bias. (Arkes, et al. 1987; Renner & Renner, 2001).   
Statement of Purpose   
Research has shown that the confirmation bias affects judgments in a wide array 
of contexts, including clinical settings.  To start, the confirmation bias affects the way 
that individuals test their hypotheses.  That is, they tend to test hypotheses in a 
confirmatory way, rather than attempting to search out information that may contradict 
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their hypotheses (Synder & Swann, 1978).  Studies have further demonstrated that the 
confirmation bias not only affects one’s hypothesis testing strategy, but also how one 
interacts with others and how others in turn respond.   
In addition, several studies investigating the effects of diagnostic labels have 
found that such labels affect the way in which subjects interpret information.  For 
example, Herbert, Nelson, and Herbert, (1988) found that assessment of “normal” 
behavior was affected by the provision of a clinical diagnosis.  Interestingly, Langer and 
Abelson, (1974) found similar results, although they found that behavior therapists were 
not affected by the presence of the label “patient” whereas psychoanalytic therapists were 
susceptible and interpreted “normal” behaviors as disordered.  Temerlin (1968) also 
found similar results when subjects interpreted “normal, healthy” behaviors as psychotic 
after hearing a prestigious clinician make a statement that the client was “psychotic.”  
Making the problem even more complicated are the findings of Arkes and Harkness 
(1980), who found that clinicians remember a case differently when they make a 
diagnosis.  For example, if a diagnosis of depression is made, they may remember 
symptoms of depression being present that the client never actually endorsed.  The 
studies collectively demonstrate that the confirmation bias is a potentially serious 
problem for clinicians. 
Other researchers have found that the confirmation bias affects clinical decision 
making in several ways.  First, Haverkamp (1993) found that subject’s questions were 
confirmatory 64% of the time and disconfirmatory only 15% of the time.  This is a 
potential problem for clinicians if they are only seeking to confirm their initial 
hypotheses, and disregarding later contradictory information.  Second, clinicians may 
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only take a very brief amount of time to make a diagnosis.  In some cases, a clinician may 
only take 30 seconds to make a diagnosis (Gauron & Dickinson, 1969).  Other 
researchers have found that it takes clinicians three minutes, (Sandifer, Hordern, & 
Greene, 1970), still a very short period of time to gather information.  In addition to the 
short amount of time it takes clinicians to make their initial judgments of clients, another 
potential problem is the amount of information that clients reveal during the first session.  
Because it is often not possible for the client to reveal all of the necessary information for 
an accurate diagnosis in the first session, clinicians may form incorrect diagnostic 
impressions based on insufficient data.  In addition, the client may want to develop a 
strong rapport with the therapist before revealing highly personal information.  This alone 
is not necessarily problematic.  However, it does become problematic when a therapist 
makes an initial impression and then disregards inconsistent information in later sessions.  
Again, the confirmation bias is a concern for clinicians, as accuracy in diagnosis is an 
essential first step in treatment.   
Given all of this information, the confirmation bias has the potential to 
significantly impact a clinician’s diagnostic impressions.  First, a client may not feel 
comfortable revealing highly personal information during the first session, or even the 
first several sessions.  Or, they may simply not have enough time to disclose all of the 
relevant information necessary for a clinician to make an accurate diagnosis.  As 
suggested by the work of Gauron and Dickenson (1969) and Sandifer et al. (1970), the 
clinician may form a hypothesis well before the necessary information is revealed.  If the 
clinician then follows in line with Haverkamp’s (1993) research and questions the client 
in a way that confirms his or her initial hypotheses, he or she may make a diagnosis 
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prematurely.  Following the results of Arkes and Harkness (1980), the clinician may then 
remember information consistent with the diagnosis and include symptoms that the client 
never actually endorsed.      
Cognitive biases and heuristics are clearly a potential problem within the clinical 
domain.  This is especially true when the confirmation bias is made even stronger 
through lack of awareness and overconfidence in one’s clinical skills.  Research has 
suggested that clinicians are highly susceptible to making errors in their clinical judgment 
(Kahemann & Tversky, 1974).  However, Greene et al. (1982) and Highhouse and 
Bottrill (1995) and others have found that people who were warned about cognitive 
biases were able to resist the bias when warned prior to reviewing the information.  This 
work also suggests that clinicians are not as aware of these biases unless they are 
educated or warned prior to making an assessment, and some may continue to evidence 
cognitive biases.   
Many suggestions have been made regarding the question of how to reduce 
cognitive biases. Some of these include considering alternatives, perspective taking, and 
educating subjects about biases, in particular warning them not to be influenced by a 
certain bias.  Of particular interest in the context of the present study are the attempts to 
debias through the use of education or warning subjects about a bias prior to undertaking 
a task.  Based on the studies mentioned, the results are not entirely conclusive, with some 
authors suggesting that warning subjects about a bias is inadequate, whereas others have 
found great success in warning subjects. (Highhouse & Bottrill, 1995; Green, Flynn & 
Loftus, 1982; Newstead & Pollard et al. 1992; Tweney, Doherty, & Worner, et al. 1980).  
It appears that education may be an effective technique, and may be especially effective 
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when used in conjunction with an attempt to decrease overconfidence.  It appears that this 
may be the most promising technique as it has a high level of practical utility.  That is, it 
does not involve any extensive training or elaborate procedures, as some other 
approaches do, and may be readily applicable to subjects in the clinical setting.    
This research raises interesting questions about cognitive biases and whether 
clinicians are able to resist biases when assessing and diagnosing clients.  We believed 
that if the confirmation bias could be resisted by subjects during a laboratory clinical task 
(Highhouse & Bottrill, 1995), perhaps the confirmation bias could be resisted within a 
clinical setting as well.  The present study examined these questions.  First, this study 
examined the existence of the confirmation bias among clinicians receiving inconsistent 
information in two case vignettes across two different time points.  This study has also 
assessed whether clinicians who were educated about the confirmation bias prior to 
making a diagnosis were able to guard against the bias.  In addition, this study took steps 
beyond the education and warning studies discussed above.  First, the case vignettes 
provided to clinicians were separated by a one week interval, simulating the typical 
outpatient psychotherapy setting, thus providing greater ecological validity.  The 
procedures remained as close as possible to actual clinical contexts, while continuing 
sufficient experimental control.  In addition, given the research on overcorrection and 
unnecessary correction, (Stapel, Martin & Schwartz, 1998) a control group was included 
to determine whether merely telling subjects about a bias would oversensitize them to 
alter a diagnosis when no change is necessary. 
The present study therefore addressed the following research questions:  
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1.  Do clinicians evidence a confirmation bias in an ecologically valid analogue 
diagnostic assessment task?  That is, do they fail to alter their initial diagnostic judgment 
based on new data when the latter could disconfirm the initial diagnosis?   It was 
hypothesized that a significant number of clinicians would evidence the confirmation bias 
and fail to alter their initial diagnosis even when new information presented at time two 
had disconfirming evidence.   
2.  Do explicit instructions regarding the confirmation bias mitigate its effects?  It 
was hypothesized that the presence of instructions regarding the confirmation bias would 
mitigate the effects of the confirmation bias.  Specifically, for those participants who 
received confirmation bias instructions in a condition in which a diagnostic change was 
required, it was expected that they would alter their diagnosis at a significantly higher 
rate than those who did not receive confirmation bias instructions.   
3.  Do clinicians who receive information about the confirmation bias engage in 
unnecessary correction of the confirmation bias?  That is, do they alter an initial 
diagnosis when the information provided does not indicate that a change in diagnosis is 
indicated?  It was hypothesized that the presence of the confirmation bias instructions 
would not lead clinicians to inaccurately alter their initial diagnosis, or to over-correct.  
Specifically, it was expected that clinicians who received the confirmation bias 
instructions would not alter their diagnosis when no change was required.  
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Chapter 2: Methods 
Participants 
A total of 102 participants completed this study at both time points and data 
collection took place over a period of nine months.  Participants were recruited from 
several psychology listservs including 1) The Acceptance and Commitment Therapy 
(ACT) listserv, 2) The Association for Behavioral and Cognitive Therapy (ABCT) 
listserv, 3) The Counselor Education and Supervision (Cesnet) listserv, as well as, 4) The 
Society for a Science of Clinical Psychology (SSCP) listserv.  In addition, requests were 
sent to several institutions such as practicum sites through Drexel University’s 
Psychology Department, and approximately twelve rotation sites through the Southwest 
Consortium Pre-doctoral Psychology Internship Program in Albuquerque, New Mexico .  
It was also requested that clinicians who received the study information distribute it to 
other clinicians who fit the inclusion criteria.  The inclusion criteria were:  (a) licensure 
as a psychologist in any state or Canadian province, and (b) current practice of 
psychodiagnosis and psychotherapy.  There were no exclusion criteria.  
In addition, 62 clinicians took part at time one and not at time two.  The reasons 
for this are unclear due to the anonymity of participation.  However, it is possible that 
because each participant was asked to take part at two different time points, the 
commitment was more difficult to follow through with.  In addition, it is possible that 
clinicians may have completed the task at time one, forgotten their subject number and 
started again.  Therefore, there is a possibility, because the study is anonymous per IRB 
requirements, that some clinicians took part at time one and then repeated participation at 
time one in order to complete the study.  Finally, general reminder emails were sent out 
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to participants who may have participated, i.e., those clinicians at practicum sites and 
rotations sites, requesting that anyone who began the study at time one log on to the 
website to complete step two.  The specific participants who took part at time one were 
not identified through the emails; rather, the initial recruitment emails that were sent out 
to groups of clinicians were followed up with and all responses continued to remain 
anonymous.  It may be that those clinicians were more likely to follow through, 
compared to those clinicians that received the information about the study via listservs, 
and did not receive any reminders.    
Research Design 
The research design was a 2 (debiasing instructions vs. no debiasing instructions) 
by 2 (diagnostic change vs. no diagnostic change vignette) by 2 (time: baseline vs. 1 
week retest) mixed factorial design, with the instructions factor being between-subjects 
and with repeated measures on the last two factors (see Figure 1).  Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of two groups.  One group received instructions regarding the 
confirmation bias with particular emphasis on its potential impact on the 
psychodiagnostic process, whereas the other group received no such instructions.  
Participants in each group were presented with two clinical vignettes at baseline (time 1), 
then additional information on each vignette at 1-week retest (time 2).  In the diagnostic 
change condition, the information presented at time 2 required a change in the diagnosis 
according to DSM-IV criteria.  In the no change condition, the information provided at 
time 2 was fully consistent with the information provided at time 1, and did not require a 
change in diagnosis.   
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In addition, the specific vignettes were counterbalanced across condition, such 
that participants were able to rate different vignettes in each of the two diagnostic 
conditions.  That is, a total of four vignettes were used, as described below (see Figure 2).  
The primary dependent variable was a categorical variable representing whether 
participants accurately changed or did not change their diagnosis from time 1 to time 2.  
Thus, for purposes of data analysis, the design can be conceptualized as a 2 (debiasing 
instructions vs. no debiasing instructions) by 2 (diagnostic change vs. no diagnostic 
change vignette) mixed factorial design, with the first factor being between-subjects and 
the second being within-subjects.  The time factor was not analyzed as a factor per se, but 
instead represents the categorical dependent variable (i.e., whether or not participants 
accurately modified their diagnosis). 
Materials 
Case vignettes.  Four case descriptions based on examples from the DSM-IV 
Case Book (Spitzer, Gibbon, Skodol, Williams, & First, 1994) and the DSM-IV-TR Case 
Studies (Frances & Ross, 2001) were used (see Appendix G).  Materials were designed so 
that, per strict adherence to DSM-IV criteria, one could reach a specific diagnosis after 
reading the material.  This was confirmed through pilot work with experienced 
diagnosticians and is discussed further below.  
Each case description was divided into two parts.  The first part was provided to 
the clinicians at time 1, and the second at time 2, one week later.  Two of the case 
vignettes involved an anxiety disorder, and two involved a psychotic disorder.  Vignette 
A began with a description of symptoms characteristic of Panic Disorder with 
Agoraphobia.  The second part of vignette A, provided at time 2, continued with a 
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description of Panic Disorder with Agoraphobia.  Vignette B likewise began with a 
description of Panic Disorder with Agoraphobia.  The second part of vignette B, 
however, consisted of symptoms that modify the diagnostic picture to be consistent with 
Social Anxiety Disorder.  Vignette C began with a description of Schizophreniform 
Disorder.  The second part of vignette C, provided at time 2, continued with a description 
of Schizophreniform Disorder.  Finally, vignette D started with a description of 
Schizophreniform Disorder.  However, the information provided at time 2 modified the 
diagnosis to an Alcohol Induced Psychotic Disorder.   
Procedure   
 In an attempt to ensure that the clinicians would assign the correct diagnosis to 
each vignette independent of the other vignettes, a pilot procedure was conducted with 
experienced clinicians not taking part in the study.  Twenty clinicians including senior 
level clinical psychology graduate students at Drexel University read these vignettes 
independent of the other vignettes and assigned diagnoses to each vignette they read.  
The results suggested that these clinicians were accurate 96% of the time.  
 In addition, in order to investigate the effect of the confirmation bias instructions 
on clinicians’ diagnostic decision making, an assurance was needed that these vignettes 
would elicit the confirmation bias for some clinicians.  A second pilot study was 
conducted with another set of practicing clinicians, also not taking part in the study, to 
determine whether or not the existing vignettes would elicit the confirmation bias.  
Twenty-five participants participated in this pilot study.  Results of the pilot study 
suggested that clinicians evidenced the confirmation bias approximately 23% of the time, 
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and therefore the vignettes did not require modification.  Data collection for both pilot 
studies took place over the course of 3 months. 
The procedural design was developed in a way that incorporated the IRB 
requirements for strict anonymity for all participants.  First, several listserv 
administrators were contacted via email requesting permission to advertise for 
participants through their listserv (Appendix A).  Once we received permission, another 
email was sent to the administrators that they then forwarded to the members of the 
listserv.  This email included a brief overview of the general purpose of the study, the 
study procedures, and the approximate amount of time required to participate in the study 
(Appendix B).  If clinicians were still interested in participating, they clicked on a link 
that directed them to the first page of the website where they read additional information 
about the study and were given the option to participate.  In an attempt to eliminate those 
clinicians who were not willing to complete the study, it was also on this page that each 
reader was encouraged not to participate unless they were willing to take part at both time 
points (Appendix C).  
If the reader agreed to participate, he or she would randomly click on either A, B, 
C or D, which were all links that provided the participant with access to the first two 
vignettes.  However, prior to reading the vignettes, each participant was directed to a 
page that required them to assign themselves a five digit subject number and which gave 
more specific instructions (Appendix D).  This allowed each participant and their 
responses to remain completely anonymous.  After reading each of the first two vignettes, 
each participant completed a form asking for their clinical impression ratings such as a 
DSM-IV diagnosis as well as what they may have thought to be potential obstacles to 
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treatment.  Once participants read the first two vignettes and completed the clinical 
impression rating forms (Appendix H), they were asked to complete a demographic form 
(Appendix I).  Once the form was complete and the participant clicked on another link, 
the information was sent to a secure database.  At this time, each participant’s subject 
number appeared on the screen.  This screen reminded each participant to write down his 
or her subject number as well as a reminder to log on to the same website in 
approximately one week.  One to two weeks later, the participants logged onto the 
website.  At the bottom of the page, an option was provided for those participants logging 
on at time two.  After clicking on that link, they were required to enter their five-digit 
subject number.  If they did not have that number, they were not able to participate at 
time two and the data from time one was not included in the data analysis.  If they were 
able to enter their subject number, they were given the final instructions (Appendix E) 
and were given access to a) the first two vignettes they read at time one, b) the initial 
clinical impression rating forms with their responses from time one, c) two additional 
vignettes, and d) two new blank clinical impression rating forms.  Once the participants 
read the new vignettes, and completed the new forms, they submitted them to the same 
secure database by clicking on another link.  Finally, participants had the option of 
clicking on one final link to receive several suggestions for how to avoid making the 
confirmation bias when practicing psychodiagnosis and psychodiagnostic decision 
making (Appendix J).  They were also given the website address where the results of the 
study will be posted once the study is complete.  The web address is 
http://www.psychology.drexel.edu/anxietyresearch/pages/. 
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 Prior to presentation of the vignettes at time 2, participants in the bias 
sensitization condition, sets B and C were provided with a description of the confirmation 
bias, a brief discussion of its relevance to the psychodiagnostic process, and instructions 
to be aware of the bias when completing the task (Appendix F).  Those in the no bias 
sensitization instruction condition, sets A and D, did not receive these instructions.  
Instructional condition was determined through random assignment when each 
participant selected the A, B, C or D condition.  To ensure that each experimental 
condition had an equal number of participants, conditions were blocked one at a time on 
the website once 25 participants had taken part at both time points so that new 
participants would not select a condition which already had 25 subjects.       
Regardless of instructional condition, at time two, all participants were provided 
with the same vignettes they read at time one, plus additional information on each 
vignette.  For one of the vignettes, the additional information was consistent with the 
original diagnosis.  For the other vignette, the additional information required a change in 
diagnosis.  The specific disorders displayed in the vignettes (i.e., an anxiety disorder vs. a 
psychotic disorder) were counterbalanced across condition.  In addition, the order of 
presentation of the vignettes (i.e., diagnostic change vs. no change condition) was also 
counterbalanced. 
Statistical Analyses   
The principal dependent measure was a binomial category reflecting whether 
participants accurately changed or did not change their diagnosis from time 1 to time 2.  
These data were analyzed by a modified form of logistic regression known as generalized 
estimating equations (GEE).  In standard logistic regression, a categorical dependent 
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variable is predicted by either categorical or continuous predictor variables, but the latter 
must represent independent observations (i.e., they must be between-subjects variables).  
GEE permits one or more of the predictors to be a repeated-measures variable.  The first 
predictor variable is instructional condition, and the second is diagnostic change 
condition, both of which were dummy-coded.  The effect of interest is the interaction 
between these two variables, which was entered into the equation following the two 
predictors.   
Statistical Power  
As GEE is a relatively new technique, the methods for estimating power for 
interaction effects are not yet established.  Thus, standard multiple regression was used to 
estimate the number of participants required for the present study.  For a medium effect 
size based on Cohen’s (1988) conventions for a multiple regression with two predictor 
variables and their interaction, 68 participants are required to achieve a power of .80 and 
alpha of .05.  Because logistic regression is generally less powerful due to the dependent 
variable being dichotomous rather than continuous, a minimum of 100 participants were 
required to be enrolled and a total of 102 clinicians took part in the study at both time 
points.  Due to the significant main effect described below, it is clear that 102 participants 
were sufficient to have an adequate level of power.  Counting each trial as independent, 
(which is valid given the significant difference between participants’ accuracy between 
the psychotic and the anxiety vignettes) the sample size is adequate to detect a 20-
percentage point difference in accuracy, e.g., 50% vs. 70%.  For the worst case, where we 
consider a sample size of 102 participants split 51 vs. 51, we could detect a 28% point 
difference.  
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Chapter 3: Results 
Demographics   
A total of 102 participants completed the study at both time points, totaling 25 in 
two of the experimental conditions, and 24 and 28 in the two remaining conditions.  An 
additional 62 participants completed the study at time one, but did not complete the study 
at time two.  These participants were flagged two and a half to three weeks after they 
participated at time one to ensure that an appropriate and realistic time line was followed 
to mirror real world time between psychotherapy sessions.  If any of these participants 
attempted to complete the study, their data would not have been used.  However, none of 
the participants that allowed two and a half weeks to lapse attempted to complete the 
study at time two. 
Gender:  A total of 61 women and 38 men took part in the study (See table 1).  
Three participants did not identify their gender.  
Age:  The age of participants ranged from 24 to79 with a bimodal distribution.  A 
large number of participants were in their mid thirties and mid fifties (See table 2).   
Years in practice:  The participants’ number of years in practice ranged from 1 
year to 52 years, with a large number of the participants practicing between 2 and 6 years 
(See table 3).  
Theoretical Orientation:  Participants' primary theoretical orientation ranged over 
nine different orientations including psychodynamic, cognitive-behavioral, family 
systems, eclectic, biological, ecological, bio-psycho-social, humanistic and existential. 
Participants were not provided with a pre-determined list of orientations and were free to 
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write in their orientation.  The majority of the participants (57.8%) reported that they 
were cognitive-behavioral in their approach to psychotherapy (See table 4).   
Data Analytic Strategy 
The principal dependent measure was a binomial category reflecting whether 
participants accurately changed or did not change their diagnosis from time 1 to time 2.  
The first predictor variable was instructional condition, and the second was diagnostic 
change condition, both of which were dummy-coded.  The primary effect of interest was 
the interaction between these two variables, which was entered into the equation 
following the two predictors.   
Of note, tables 5a and 5b reflect change, or consistency, whereas tables 6 and 7 
reflect accuracy.  Specifically, being correct in changing one’s diagnosis does not 
necessarily imply diagnostic accuracy.  For example, a clinician may accurately change a 
diagnosis in the change condition, but may inaccurately change the diagnosis from panic 
disorder to generalized anxiety disorder, rather than change it to the correct diagnosis of 
social phobia.  Analyses were run using both consistency and then accuracy as standards.  
As the pattern of results was identical for these two standards, only the accuracy results 
are reported below.  In addition, note that the results presented do not include vignette 
type as a covariate unless otherwise specified, as results were run both ways and results 
were consistent.      
Main Analyses 
Main Effect #1.  Results suggest that the diagnostic change condition led to poorer 
performance overall relative to the no-change condition (GEE Parameter Estimate = -
2.01, SE = .72, p = .005).  That is, when the vignettes required a diagnostic change, 
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participants did not perform as well compared to when the vignettes required the 
diagnosis to remain consistent.  
Main Effect #2.  Results suggested that overall, the presence of confirmation bias 
instructions did not affect participants' performance (GEE Parameter Estimate = -.08, SE 
= .84, p = .92).  Therefore, independent of the diagnostic change condition, the presence 
of the confirmation bias instructions did not affect performance by participants. 
Interaction Effect.  When the interaction of the main effects were analyzed, no 
significant interaction effect was noted (GEE Parameter Estimate = .42, SE = 1.01, p = 
.68).  Specifically, the interaction of the diagnostic change condition and the confirmation 
bias instructions did not lead to a change in accuracy by participants.   
In summary, the diagnostic change condition led participants to perform poorly 
relative to the no change condition.  Second, the confirmation bias instructions neither 
hindered no helped the participants in their performance.  Finally, the interaction of the 
two main effects did not affect participants' performance in either a positive or negative 
way.   
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis I: A significant number of clinicians will evidence the confirmation bias and 
fail to alter their initial diagnosis even when new information presented at time two has 
disconfirming evidence.  
Results of Hypothesis I: Overall, clinicians evidenced the confirmation bias 33% of the 
time in this condition.  In examining more closely each vignette, clinicians evidenced the 
confirmation bias 16% of the time when evaluating the psychotic vignettes, and 50% of 
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the time when assessing the anxiety vignettes.  See tables 6 and 7 for descriptive 
information.   
Hypothesis II: Presentation of instructions regarding the confirmation bias will mitigate 
the effects of the confirmation bias.  Specifically, for those participants who received 
confirmation bias instructions in a condition where a diagnostic change was required, it 
was expected that they would alter their diagnosis at a significantly higher rate than those 
who did not receive confirmation bias instructions.   
Results of Hypothesis II: Results showed that the percentage of clinicians who evidenced 
the confirmation bias even when provided with the confirmation bias sensitization 
instructions was 23%, compared to 33% in the condition where no instructions were 
received (see table 6).  As noted above, this difference did not reach statistical 
significance. 
Hypothesis III: The presence of the confirmation bias instructions will not lead clinicians 
to inaccurately alter their initial diagnosis, or to overcorrect.  Specifically, clinicians who 
receive the confirmation bias instructions will not alter their diagnosis when no change is 
required.  
Results of Hypothesis III: Results suggest that the confirmation bias instructions did not 
lead clinicians to inaccurately alter their diagnosis in the conditions in which it should not 
have changed.  Over-correction occurred 5.7% of the time in the confirmation bias 
sensitization instructions condition, compared to 6.1% in the condition with no 
confirmation bias instructions (see table 6). 
 Examination of table 6 indicates the percentage of clinicians who were accurate in 
each condition collapsed across vignette type.  It is interesting to note that it appears as 
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though the confirmation bias sensitization instructions resulted in a trend for participants 
to perform more accurately when a change in diagnosis was required.  Specifically, 
within this condition, accuracy reached 77%, compared to 67% without confirmation bias 
instructions.   However, despite the appearance of slightly more accurate performance in 
this condition, this effect did not reach statistical significance (GEE Parameter Estimate 
= .75, SE = 1.04, p = .47).  
 Table 7 reports the percentage of clinicians who were accurate in each condition 
broken down by type of vignette, i.e, psychotic vignettes versus the anxiety vignettes.  
Interestingly, 16% of clinicians evidenced the confirmation bias without the bias 
sensitization instructions when evaluating the psychotic vignette, whereas 50% of 
clinicians evidenced the confirmation bias without the instructions when assessing the 
anxiety vignette.   
Finally, despite receiving confirmation bias sensitization instructions, clinicians 
continued to evidence the confirmation bias 12% of the time when evaluating the 
psychotic vignette and 32% of the time when evaluating the anxiety vignette.  
Additional Analyses 
Predictive Factors 
Gender:  Results indicate that gender was not a significant predictor of diagnostic 
accuracy (GEE Parameter Estimate = .44, SE = .37 p = .24); gender was therefore not 
included as a factor in subsequent analyses.   
Vignette Type:  All analyses were run with and without vignette type, (the 
psychotic vignette versus the anxiety vignette) as a covariate, given the significant 
differences between participants' performance across vignette type (GEE Parameter 
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Estimate = -25.61, SE = .68, p <.0001).  As discussed above, note that the results 
presented do not include vignette type as a covariate unless otherwise specified, as results 
were consistent across both analyses.   
Age:  Results indicate that age was negatively correlated with performance (GEE 
Parameter Estimate = -.04, SE = .02, p = .02).   
 Years in Practice:  Results indicate that years in practice was not a significant 
predictor of accuracy (GEE Parameter Estimate = -.02, SE = .02, p = .28).  
Orientation:  When all orientations were analyzed as a predictor of performance, 
the results were insignificant.  When CBT was analyzed alone compared to all other 
orientations, the results again did not indicate a significant difference between 
orientations as a predictor of overall accuracy (GEE Parameter Estimate = -.01, SE = .37, 
p = .99).  However, given that there was a significant difference in participants' 
performance between the psychotic vignettes and the anxiety vignettes, (GEE Parameter 
Estimate = -25.61, SE = .68, p <.0001) vignette type was added in as a predictor variable 
for this analysis.  These results suggest that those who identified their orientation as 
cognitive-behavioral performed better on the psychotic vignettes (GEE Parameter 
Estimate = -2.43, SE = 1.24, p = .05) although no difference in orientation was noted for 
the anxiety vignettes.   
Finally, results suggest that age was not a predictor of orientation (GEE 
Parameter Estimate = .02, SE = .03, p = .53). 
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Chapter 4: Discussion 
Purpose 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the effects of the confirmation in the 
process of clinical psychodiagnosis, as well as the possibility that instructions regarding 
such a bias might mitigate its effects.  The study investigated whether clinicians would 
fail to alter an initial diagnosis even when additional information warranted a change.  
The effects of information about the confirmation bias were hypothesized to correct the 
bias.  However, there was a possibility that participants might evidence an over-
correction when they received information about the confirmation bias.  Specifically, this 
study investigated whether participants who received confirmation bias instructions 
would change their initial diagnosis, even when the symptoms presented at time two did 
not require a change.  Finally, this study investigated the possible effects of gender, age, 
years in practice, and theoretical orientation on diagnostic accuracy.  Specifically, the 
study investigated whether these variables were significant predictors of the tendency to 
demonstrate the confirmation bias in the process of psychodiagnosis.   
In sum, the overall purpose of this study was to determine whether the 
confirmation bias occurred during an analogue study and whether the confirmation bias 
instructions would mitigate the confirmation bias effects in any way.  It was hoped that 
the results might be applicable to actual clinical practice, in which clinicians may be 
evidencing this bias with their patients.  Given the potential problems caused by the 
confirmation bias, decreasing this bias among clinicians is a high priority. 
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Summary of Results  
Demographics 
 A total of 102 clinicians participated at both time points.  Sixty- two clinicians 
took part at time one and not at time two.  Thirty-eight men and 61 women took part in 
the study, and three participants did not identify their gender.  The age of participants 
ranged from 24 to 79.  Years in practice ranged from 1 to 52.  Finally, participants 
identified themselves as belonging to one of nine different orientations, although the 
majority identified themselves as having a cognitive behavioral orientation. 
Main Analyses 
First, the results suggest that when a change in diagnosis was required in the 
vignettes from time one to time two, regardless of the presence of confirmation bias 
instructions, participants tended to perform poorly.  Overall, 32.6 % of the clinicians that 
took part in this study evidenced the confirmation bias.  Second, the results suggest that 
regardless of diagnostic change condition, the presence of the confirmation bias 
sensitization instructions did not affect participant's performance.  Overall, 23% of 
participants in the change condition continued to evidence the confirmation bias even 
with instructions warning them to be aware of this bias, compared to 33% that evidenced 
the bias in the change condition without instructions.  Moreover, 5.7% of participants 
changed their diagnosis at time two when they should have remained consistent when 
they received confirmation bias instructions, compared to 6.1% of participants who 
changed their diagnosis in the no change condition, when they did not receive 
confirmation bias instructions.  The results did not indicate any significant interaction 
between the two main effects, i.e., the diagnostic change condition and the confirmation 
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bias instructions condition.  Finally, as noted above, participants' performance was 
significantly different between the psychotic vignettes and the anxiety vignettes.  
Specifically, participants performed more accurately when taking part in the anxiety 
vignettes (GEE Parameter Estimate = -25.61, SE = .68, p <.001).  
Predictor Variables 
Results suggest that neither gender nor years in practice played a role in whether 
participants evidenced the confirmation bias.  However, the results suggest that age was 
negatively correlated with accuracy in performance.   
Finally, there was no significant difference between each orientation when all 
were included as distinct predictors.  In addition, there was no significant difference 
between CBT and all other orientations combined in predicting accuracy in diagnosis, 
except when vignette type was factored in as a covariate.  Here, those who identified 
themselves as cognitive behavioral in orientation performed more accurately on the 
psychotic vignettes. 
Implications 
   It appears that gender was not a significant predictor variable for evidencing the 
confirmation bias.  Therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that both male and female 
clinicians of any training level are equally susceptible to making the confirmation bias.  
This is not surprising, as there is no a priori reason to suspect that either gender would be 
more or less prone to the confirmation bias, although it provides additional evidence that 
this is a problem that all clinicians need to be aware of.   
It also appears that years in practice was not a significant predictor variable for 
evidencing the confirmation bias.  This suggests that clinicians do not become less (nor 
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more) prone to the bias as they continue in their practice of psychodiagnosis.  Therefore, 
experienced and less experienced clinicians are equally susceptible to evidencing this 
bias.  This highlights the need to determine a way to counter the bias as additional 
experience does not protect against it.   
The results also suggest that age was negatively correlated with accuracy in 
performance.  This may be due in part to the notion that newer training programs may 
tend to be more focused on empirically supported assessment strategies, and therefore 
may also focus more extensively on issues such as cognitive biases.  Although this may 
not be the case across all programs, especially when free-standing professional schools 
are considered, it may be the case with the majority of the training programs represented 
by the present sample.  Recall that many of the listservs through which participants were 
recruited were comprised mainly of clinical psychologists who generally adhere to a 
scientific-practitioner training model.  It is also possible that younger clinicians who were 
trained with the DSM-III (or subsequent editions of the DSM) tend to take a more 
systematic approach to psychodiagnosis compared to those clinicians who were trained 
earlier.   
Orientation was not a predictor of accuracy when vignette type was not factored 
into the equation.  However, when analyzing orientation as a predictor of accuracy by 
vignette type, those who identified their orientation as cognitive behavioral performed 
more accurately for the psychotic vignettes than those in all other orientations combined.  
However, there was no significant difference in performance for the anxiety vignettes.  
This result is somewhat confusing as there is no a priori reason for those clinicians who 
identify themselves as cognitive behavioral to perform more accurately on one vignette 
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but not another.  However, this may be due in part to the fact that the majority of those 
who participated identified themselves as cognitive behavioral and the majority of errors 
took place within the anxiety disorder vignettes.  Therefore, this may be coincidence and 
not a true difference in ability.   
Overall, a comparison in participant’s performance between the psychotic 
vignettes and the anxiety vignettes suggested that participants made more errors when 
completing the anxiety vignettes.  The psychotic vignette was always presented first in 
each set and the anxiety vignette was always presented second.  Although the diagnostic 
change condition was counterbalanced across each set, the results revealed that 
participants made more errors for the anxiety vignettes.  It is possible that these errors 
were made due to the order in which vignettes were given, or it may be due to the 
similarities in symptoms across anxiety disorders.  For example, the evidence is presented 
more clearly in the psychotic vignette regarding the etiology of the pseudo client’s 
psychosis.  That is, the vignette clearly states that she had been drinking for the same 
amount of time that she had experienced the psychotic symptoms and a large part of the 
vignette is devoted to making that point clear.  The symptoms for the anxiety vignettes 
are more similar in nature as they both focus on symptoms of anxiety.  Clinicians reading 
the anxiety vignettes may have focused more on the pseudo-patient’s physical symptoms 
rather than the fact that these symptoms were elicited by social situations.   Specifically, 
clinicians may have overlooked the fact that many people suffer from panic attacks when 
they suffer from social phobia, and the participants may have focused on the fact that the 
client was still experiencing anxiety attacks.  Finally, another explanation is that this 
difference in performance stems from variability in clinicians’ diagnostic skills.  For 
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example, some clinicians may not be aware of the precise nuances between the various 
anxiety disorders.  Specifically, they may not understand that panic attacks commonly 
occur within the context of other anxiety disorders aside from panic disorder itself, and in 
fact do occur within the context of social phobia.  Therefore, this result may be based on 
knowledge of diagnostic standards rather than the confirmation per se. 
Interestingly, the majority of those who participated in this study identified 
themselves as having a cognitive-behavioral orientation.  This fits with the fact that there 
were a large percentage of younger clinicians taking part in the study, and many had been 
practicing for only 2-6 years, as newer training programs are frequently cognitive-
behavioral in focus.  In addition, several of the listservs that were used to recruit 
participants were cognitive-behavioral in nature and focused on empirically supported 
treatments, e.g., SSCP, ACT and ABCT.  Additionally, many clinicians may claim to be 
cognitive-behavioral in orientation due to the gradual shift in focus over the last twenty 
years from psychodynamic psychotherapy to cognitive-behavioral therapy, but may not 
truly have the appropriate training in cognitive-behavioral therapy, or may not truly 
practice from a cognitive-behavioral orientation.  Finally, many clinicians may consider 
themselves to be primarily cognitive-behavioral, but may truly practice from an eclectic 
approach. 
Given that participants performed poorly overall when they completed a vignette 
set that required a change in diagnosis compared to their performance when completing a 
vignette set that did not require a change in diagnosis supports the notion that clinicians 
often like to remain consistent even when additional disconfirming evidence is provided, 
and suggests a confirmatory approach to psychodiagnosis.  In addition, this was true 
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regardless of whether or not the confirmation bias instructions were present, providing 
evidence for the strength of the confirmation bias.  This result supports the work of 
Elstein et al. (1978), Gauron and Dickinson (1969), Sandifer et al. (1970), and Synder 
and Swann (1978), and as well as many others who also found that the confirmation bias 
was evidenced in their work.     
Interestingly, the presence of the confirmation bias instructions, regardless of 
diagnostic change condition, did not significantly affect participants' performance.  This 
suggests that the confirmation bias instructions did not help clinicians to perform more 
accurately in any significant way, although it also did not hinder clinicians’ performance 
in a significant way either.  Specifically, the confirmation bias instructions did not 
significantly help participants to accurately change their initial diagnosis when the 
vignette called for such a change, and therefore, participants continued to evidence the 
confirmation bias.  In addition, the confirmation bias instructions did not help participants 
to remain consistent when the vignettes required no change in diagnosis as there was no 
significant difference between the groups in the no change condition.   
However, based on the results discussed from table 6, it may be that the 
confirmation bias instructions did positively affect participants’ performance, although 
not significantly and a type II error may have been made.  When evaluating the difference 
in percentages between those who altered their diagnosis when a change was required 
and received confirmation bias sensitization instructions relative to those who altered 
their diagnosis when a change was required and did not receive confirmation bias 
instructions, there appears to be a trend, albeit not statistically significant (see table 6).  
Specifically, those in the change condition who received the confirmation bias 
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instructions performed with 77% accuracy whereas those in the change condition who did 
not receive confirmation bias instructions performed at 67%accuracy.  These results 
suggest that the confirmation bias instructions may have in fact contributed to a trend 
toward more accurate performance when a change in diagnosis was warranted.  This non 
significant result may be due to limited power; perhaps with a larger sample size the 
difference would have reached statistical significance.  In addition, despite the 
nonsignificant result, this should be considered in future studies, especially given the 
work of Mynatt et al. (1977), Newstead et al. (1992), Newstead et al. (1994) and Tweney 
et al. (1980) who found that educating subjects about biases was somewhat successful.  
This insignificant trend is consistent with this literature, as one might expect that the 
confirmation bias instructions would improve performance in the change condition, e.g., 
if a clinician is uncertain about changing a diagnosis, the confirmation bias instructions 
may lead the clinician to alter their diagnosis in an attempt to avoid making the 
confirmation bias.   
One explanation for why some participants continued to show the confirmation 
bias despite the presence of confirmation bias sensitization instructions is that they were 
eager to complete the task and did not read the instructions carefully, or truly consider 
them when completing part two of the task.  Another explanation is that clinicians are 
aware that biases such as the confirmation bias exist, but do not believe that they apply to 
themselves.  They therefore may have continued to quickly dismiss disconfirmatory 
information and feel justified in seeking confirmatory information.  A third possibility is 
that these clinicians are not completely confident in their clinical skills and questioned 
their accuracy.  Finally, the most parsimonious explanation is that the confirmation bias 
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instructions are simply not powerful enough to significantly counteract such a powerful 
cognitive bias.  This is especially alarming given the frank nature of the instructions 
directly informing clinicians about the bias and warning them not to evidence this bias.     
 Overall, the results suggest that the confirmation bias is evident in the process of 
psychodiagnosis, and that instructions to beware of the confirmation bias did not 
significantly mitigate the effects of the bias.   
Limitations 
 There are several limitations of the design, data collection and external validity of 
this study.  Potential remedies for many of these limitations in future studies are 
addressed below under future directions.  One limitation is that no information was 
collected on participants’ type of degree or professional discipline.  For example, there 
may have been significant differences in accuracy between psychiatrists, psychologists, 
counselors, and social workers, although it was not possible to conduct an analysis of this 
kind.   
A second limitation is that there is no data about how the clinicians arrived at 
their diagnoses.  Of course, direct inquiry into one’s clinical decision making may not 
yield an accurate account of the process, as individuals may not be able to report 
accurately on their cognitive processes.  In addition, attending to this process in order to 
report it might very well have resulted in reactance.     
A third limitation is that the entire study was completely anonymous.  Therefore, 
we were unable to attempt to retain the 62 clinicians that took part at time one, and not at 
time two.  It may have been that they would have completed the study had a simple email 
reminder been sent to them.  In addition, it is possible that because the study was 
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completely anonymous, that some clinicians took part at time one and did not complete 
their initial task at time two, and therefore started over again with a new subject number.  
Although there is no way to determine whether or not this occurred, this may have 
influenced how these clinicians responded to the vignettes the second time that they 
participated.  That is, they may have had even more exposure to the initial vignettes, 
potentially making it more likely that they would ignore disconfirmatory data at a later 
time.  
In addition, clinicians were not only responsible for reminding themselves to 
complete the study, but they were also responsible for remembering their five-digit user 
identification number.  It is possible that if an email reminder were sent out with their 
user identification number, that more clinicians would have taken part at time two.    
Fourth, as with all analogue studies, external validity is limited.  Specifically, in 
the real world, clinicians would have the opportunity to ask questions to clarify any 
questions or concerns they may have had and patients would be able to fully report on 
their symptoms.  In support of this, there were several responses from participants that 
indicated the desire for more information about the client and the client’s symptoms in 
the vignettes.  In addition, there are many qualities attached to the real world interactions 
such as facial expression, tone of voice etc. that could not be incorporated into this study.  
Therefore, clinicians were not only limited by the lack of this information, but they may 
have also completed this task in a hurried manner, as the vignette likely did not hold any 
personal relevance to them, as a client might.  However, as there is always a balance 
between external and internal validity, we needed to continue sufficient experimental 
control while also replicating the real world time between sessions.  
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Fifth, the anxiety vignettes were always presented second in each set of vignettes.  
Given this, we are not able to rule out order effects as the psychotic vignette was always 
presented prior to the anxiety vignette.    
Sixth, this study did not inquire about participants’ confidence level.  This 
information would have been interesting, but simply asking about their confidence level 
may have influenced their responses.  That is, it may have caused the clinicians to read 
more thoroughly, focus more on their responses, and to possibly perform more 
accurately.  
Next, there were sample limitations.  Specifically, the listservs selected for 
recruitment were primarily those that attract scientifically minded clinicians.  For 
example, SSCP, ACT and ABCT are all listservs whose members are likely to endorse 
more empirically supported treatments.  This was evident in that nearly 58% of 
participants identified themselves are cognitive-behavioral in orientation.  Had this study 
recruited participants from other listservs that attract clinicians who identify themselves 
as primarily psychodynamic in nature, the sample would likely have been more balanced 
in terms of orientation.  
Finally, this study was not able to determine which clinicians spent a great deal of 
time reading the vignettes and which clinicians merely skimmed the material.  This 
would have provided useful information regarding whether the amount of time reading 
vignettes and amount of time spent in assigning diagnoses contributes to the confirmation 
bias.  
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 Whereas there are several weaknesses of the design of this study, the design is 
still able to assess the hypotheses of interest.  In addition, many of these weaknesses may 
be corrected in future studies, as discussed below.  
Strengths 
  One strength of the study is that the clinicians were instructed to complete the 
vignettes with a one-week time interval between each time point, simulating the typical 
outpatient psychotherapy setting, thus providing greater ecological validity.  The 
procedures have remained as close as possible to actual clinical contexts, while 
continuing sufficient experimental control.   
In addition, given the research on over-correction, (Stapel, Martin & Schwartz, 
1998) a control group was included to determine whether merely telling subjects about a 
bias would oversensitize them to alter a diagnosis when no change was necessary.  The 
inclusion of these various experimental conditions within one study is one of the greatest 
strengths of the study. 
Finally, all responses remained anonymous which holds the potential for 
clinicians to be more honest in their responses.  This also provides the possibility for 
clinicians to be more likely to participate.  Had the study been in person, clinicians may 
have been less likely to participate.   
Overall, there are several strengths and weaknesses.  Some of these weaknesses 
have been addressed below with suggestions for future studies and some may remain 
weaknesses in an attempt to balance internal and external validity.  It does appear that the 
study has been effective in assessing the hypotheses at hand in a valid way and therefore, 
the results should not be dismissed based on the aforementioned weaknesses.  
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Future Directions 
The results presented in this study lead to several possible follow-up studies.  A 
study incorporating the use of a structured clinical interview would be useful to 
determine whether such an interview is able to counter the biases that tend to occur 
during open ended interviews.  Based on the work of Whaley and Geller (in press), this 
may be a useful intervention to decrease the confirmation bias.  Structured interviews 
such as the Structured Clinical Interview for the DSM-IV (First et al., 1996) are quite 
lengthy, and their routine use in many clinical settings is unrealistic.  An alternative 
approach might be shorter, semi-structured interviews.  
Next, a study investigating the effects of confirmation bias instructions that are 
more strongly worded may be more effective in leading participants to a more accurate 
direction.  That is, instructions that are more strongly worded may lead clinicians to 
change their diagnosis when necessary, but not to over-correct and change their diagnosis 
when they should not.  Therefore, a study investigating several different forms of 
confirmation bias instructions would be useful in determining whether the bias 
instructions used in this study were not strongly worded enough.  However, as part of this 
study, the confirmation bias instructions were purposefully written in a way that was 
direct, although not too strongly worded, in an attempt to avoid overcorrection, or 
changing a diagnosis when there is no information that requires a change.  In addition to 
using different forms of the confirmation bias instructions, it would be useful to 
investigate more extensive training with clinicians as a way to determine whether 
clinicians would decrease their use of the confirmation bias following this training.  For 
example, it would be useful to use specific examples of how to avoid the confirmation 
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bias before taking part in a study like this one to determine whether this decreases the 
incidence of the confirmation bias.   
Another potential follow-up study would be to ensure that, as part of the 
demographic questions, participants are asked about their professional training and 
discipline, in order to determine what percentage of clinicians taking part have a Masters 
of Social Work, a Counseling or Clinical Psychology degree, or a Psychiatry degree.  
This would also determine whether professional discipline is a predictor of accuracy.  In 
addition, it would be useful to obtain information about the participants’ training 
programs and the amount of training that they received on biases and heuristics.   
In addition, based on the work of Martin (2001) and Oskamp (1965), it would be 
important to include a query about the participants’ confidence level in a future study.  It 
would also be useful to request information about how they arrived at their diagnosis.    
This may provide important information about the process that participants go through in 
making the confirmation bias and it may alter participants’ responses, either increasing or 
decreasing the rate of the confirmation bias.  For example, it may signal clinicians to re-
read the information provided, or to revisit their diagnoses before deciding how confident 
they are in their responses.   
Based on the work of Jonas et al. (2001), who point out the increase in the rate of 
the confirmation bias when information is presented and processed sequentially instead 
of simultaneously, it might be useful to conduct a study comparing the sequential versus 
simultaneous presentation of clinical data to clinicians.  However, this does not simulate 
the real world therapeutic environment where clinicians necessarily receive information 
in a sequential way from patients.  
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Another suggestion for a future study is to present the information from time one 
and time two with a shorter time period in between.  For example, leaving one to three 
days between time points may reduce the incidence of the confirmation bias, as clinicians 
may not be so attached to their initial diagnosis.  These studies may aid in learning more 
about pathways for clinicians to avoid making the confirmation bias.  
Fugelsand et al. (2004) demonstrated that with continuous experience whereby 
new data does not fit with an initial theory, participants changed their initial theory to 
include the new inconsistent data.  Another logical follow up study would extend the time 
points at which clinicians have the opportunity to alter their initial diagnoses to determine 
whether or not the same trend would occur among clinicians at one, two and three weeks 
re-test.     
Next, a study conducted with clinicians and client-actors would be useful to 
determine whether the confirmation bias exists when the “client” is sitting face to face 
with the clinician.  In this scenario, the clinician would have the advantage of asking 
additional questions rather than being limited to the information provided by a short 
vignette, as this scenario is more akin to real life clinical practice.  In addition, if the 
participants in this study evidenced the confirmation bias in part due to reading the 
vignettes very quickly, this face-to-face scenario would likely correct for these errors, as 
they would have the time to ask more in depth questions.  
Additionally, as clinicians appeared to be more accurate with the psychotic 
disorder vignette as compared to the anxiety disorder vignette, another study may 
incorporate several different vignettes which cover several categories of mental illness to 
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determine whether one type of disorder leads clinicians to evidence the confirmation bias 
more often.  
Next, it would be useful for a follow up study to incorporate a more balanced 
sample.  Specifically, as this study recruited clinicians from listservs that tend to attract 
more scientifically minded clinicians, another study could recruit clinicians from listservs 
that attract a more balanced sample of clinicians who are likely to be both cognitive 
behavioral as well as psychodynamic in orientation. 
Finally, it would be important to include technological advances such as 
computerized audio or video media that are now available to track things such as the 
amount of time clinicians spend reading the clinical information as well as the amount of 
time clinicians take to assign a diagnosis.  This may provide insight as to whether or not 
time spent reading clinical notes and assigning diagnoses was related to the confirmation 
bias. 
Most importantly, there is a great need for future studies to focus on finding 
remedies for the confirmation bias that can be easily applicable to the real world.  Given 
the work of Neighbors et al. (2003) and Trierweiler et al. (2000), who have identified 
some of the problems of the confirmation bias within the clinical context such as over-
diagnosis of African Americans with Schizophrenia, it is important that a remedy be 
found quickly.  This is not merely a problem of misdiagnosis or a labeling dilemma.  The 
consequences of the confirmation bias lead to misdiagnosis.  However, often that 
misdiagnosis has its own ramifications such as receiving different or lesser treatment 
from health care professionals, never mind the exclusionary treatment from the general 
society.  In addition, what may have been a straightforward treatment for one disorder 
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may be convoluted by ignoring disconfirming evidence and making a commitment to 
confirmatory information.  It is especially important given the frequency with which the 
confirmation bias is being made.  In this study alone, the confirmation bias was 
evidenced 33% of the time which is far too frequent.   
To summarize, the options for changes to future analogue studies are to include 
a.) using a structured clinical interview, b.) using various forms of the confirmation bias 
instructions, c.) assessing further information regarding the clinicians’ professional 
training and discipline, d.) asking about their training in biases and heuristics, e.) asking 
about the thought process behind their approach to psychodiagnosis, or how it is that they 
arrived at their diagnosis f.)  asking about participants’ confidence level, g.) examining 
simultaneous versus sequential presentation of clinical data, h.) decreasing the amount of 
time in between the presentation of the vignettes at time one and time two, i.) extending 
the number of follow-ups to allow for a decrease in the confirmation bias over time, j.) 
having client-actors serve as the base of information rather than use vignettes, and finally  
k.) investigating whether one type of disorder in the vignette pulls for the confirmation 
bias more than others.      
Finally, there are both strengths and weaknesses in the design, data collection 
strategy, and external validity in this study.  Analogue studies are useful tools to 
investigate the process of psychodiagnosis.  Whereas this is an analogue study, or a first 
step in investigating the effect of these confirmation bias instructions, there are not only 
several options for changes and additions to future analogue studies, but there are many 
avenues open for future research to more closely replicate real world scenarios as well.  It 
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is important to address these concerns, as all mental health fields would benefit to work 
toward more accuracy during the psychodiagnostic process. 
The confirmation bias is an important problem which needs immediate attention.  
The results from this study are an indication of just how powerful and ubiquitous the 
confirmation bias is.  Based on the work of Neighbors (2003), Loftus (1998), McNally 
(2001), as well as the results of the present study, the confirmation bias is evidenced far 
more than is acceptable, and the ramifications of this bias are far reaching and potentially 
detrimental to both clinicians as well as clients.  Given the problems stemming from the 
confirmation bias and the frequency with which this bias appears to be made in the 
process of psychodiagnosis, we have an urgent need to find a remedy to counteract this 
bias.  
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Figure 1. 
Research Design 
      Baseline              1-Week Retest 
Diagnosis 
Should  
Change 
Panic Disorder  Æ 
            or 
Schizophreniform DisorderÆ 
Social Anxiety Disorder 
              or 
Alcohol Induced Psychotic Disorder 
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Schizophreniform DisorderÆ 
             or 
Panic DisorderÆ 
Schizophreniform Disorder 
              or 
Panic Disorder 
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Panic DisorderÆ 
               or 
Schizophreniform DisorderÆ 
Social Anxiety Disorder 
              or 
Alcohol Induced Psychotic Disorder 
 
No Bias 
Sensitization  
Group Diagnosis 
Should not 
Change 
Panic DisorderÆ 
                or 
Schizophreniform DisorderÆ 
Panic Disorder  
               or 
Schizophreniform Disorder 
Note: This figure represents the research design indicating the possible vignettes each 
clinician received by change condition and confirmation bias instruction condition.  
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Figure 2.   
Accurate Diagnoses by Vignette 
     Baseline    1 Week Retest 
Ms. A Schizophreniform Schizophreniform Set A No 
Confirmation 
Bias 
Instructions 
Mr. B Panic Social Anxiety Disorder 
Ms. A Schizophreniform Alcohol Induced Psychosis Set B Confirmation 
Bias 
Instructions Mr. B Panic Panic 
Ms. A 
 
Schizophreniform 
 
Schizophreniform 
 
Set C Confirmation 
Bias 
Instructions 
Mr. B Panic Social Anxiety Disorder 
Ms. A Schizophreniform Alcohol Induced Psychosis Set D No 
Confirmation 
Bias 
Instructions 
Mr. B Panic Panic 
Note: This table represents the accurate diagnosis in each condition. 
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Table 5a.   
Percentage of Change in Each Condition 
 
 No Change in Diagnosis Change in Diagnosis 
No Confirmation 
Bias 
Instructions 
3/49 Changed 
 
(6.1%) 
 
33/49 Changed 
*(67%) 
Confirmation 
Bias Instructions 
3/53 Changed 
(5.7%) 
41/53 Changed 
**(77) 
 
Note: This table represents the percentage of time that clinicians changed their diagnosis 
from time one to time two in each condition regardless of whether or not they should 
have changed their diagnosis based on the information presented. 
* This cell represents the difference between 100% and 67% (33%) or, the percentage of 
time the clinicians evidenced the confirmation bias without confirmation bias 
instructions.  
** The difference between 100% and 77% (23%) represents the percentage of time these 
clinicians continued to evidence the confirmation bias even with the confirmation bias 
instructions.  
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Table 5b.  
Percentage of Change in Each Condition by Vignette Type 
 
 No Change in Diagnosis Change in Diagnosis 
Psychotic Vignette 
0/24 Changed 
(0%) 
Psychotic Vignette 
21/25 Changed 
*(84%) 
No 
Confirmation 
Bias 
Instructions 
Anxiety Vignette              
3/25 Changed 
(12%) 
Anxiety Vignette                
12/24 Changed 
*(50%) 
Psychotic Vignette 
0/28 Changed 
(0%) 
Psychotic Vignette 
22/25 Changed 
**(88%) 
  
Confirmation  
Bias Instructions 
Anxiety Vignette  
3/25 Changed 
(12%) 
Anxiety Vignette 
19/28 Changed 
**(68%) 
Note: This table represents the percentage of time that clinicians changed their diagnosis 
from time one to time two in each condition regardless of whether or not they should 
have changed their diagnosis based on the information presented. 
* The difference of 100% and 84% is 16% and the difference between 100% and 50% is 
50%, or the percentage of time clinicians evidenced the confirmation bias without 
confirmation bias instructions. 
** The difference between 100% and 88% is 12% and the difference between 100% and 
68% is 32%, or the percentage of clinicians who made the confirmation bias even with 
confirmation bias instructions.  
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Table 6. 
Accuracy in Diagnoses Across Condition  
 
 No Change in Diagnosis Change in Diagnosis 
No Confirmation 
Bias 
Instructions 
46/49 Accurate 
(94%) 
33/49 Accurate 
*(67%) 
Confirmation 
Bias Instructions 
50/53 Accurate 
(94%) 
41/53 Accurate 
*(77) 
 
Note:  * It appears as though the confirmation bias instructions resulted in a trend for 
participants to perform more accurately when a change in diagnosis was required; 
however this effect did not reach statistical significance.   
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Table 7.  
Accuracy in Diagnoses Across Condition by Vignette Type 
 
 No Change in Diagnosis Change in Diagnosis 
Psychotic Vignette 
24/24 Correct 
(100%) 
Psychotic Vignette 
21/25 Correct 
(84%) 
No 
Confirmation 
Bias 
Instructions 
Anxiety Vignette              
22/25 Correct 
(88%) 
Anxiety Vignette                
12/24 Correct 
(50%) 
Psychotic Vignette 
28/28 Correct 
(100%) 
Psychotic Vignette 
22/25 Correct 
(88%) 
  
Confirmation  
Bias Instructions 
Anxiety Vignette  
22/25 Correct 
(88%) 
Anxiety Vignette 
19/28 Correct 
(68%) 
Note: This table represents the percentage of accuracy in each condition specific to 
vignette type. 
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Appendix A: Listserv Administrator Email 
 
 
 
 
Dear Listserv Administrator:  
 We are interested in collecting data from licensed mental health professionals who are 
currently involved in the practice of psychotherapy.  With your permission, we would like to 
distribute information about our study through your listserv.  We are interested in the general 
clinical impressions of mental health professionals.  The study will involve reading several 
clinical case vignettes and recording clinical impressions for each vignette.  Participants will read 
two clinical vignettes initially, and then one week later, they will have the option to log on to our 
website, www.clinicalimpressionresearch.com, to complete the study.  At that time they will read 
two additional vignettes and record several follow up impressions.  Participation in the study will 
take approximately 5-10 minutes.  At the end of the study, participants will have the option of 
viewing several points to consider in the process of psychotherapy.  They will also have the 
option of viewing the study results at our website: 
(http://www.psychology.drexel.edu/anxietyresearch/pages/) once the study has been completed.   
 If you are willing, we would be grateful if you would send the following message to the 
members of your listserv (see below).  This message contains a link for interested participants to 
access directions for how to participate in the study.  If you do send the message below, please cc 
Meagan Carleton at mec38@drexel.edu on the email that you send to your listserv.  
If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact our project coordinator, 
Meagan Carleton, M.S., at (215) 762-3327, or by email at mec38@drexel.edu.  
Sincerely, 
James Herbert, Ph.D. 
Associate Professor 
Director of Clinical Training 
Drexel University 
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Appendix B: Recruitment Letter 
 
 
 
 
Dear colleague, 
 We are currently conducting a study of the clinical impressions of licensed mental 
health professionals currently engaged in the practice of psychotherapy, and we would be 
grateful if you would consider participating in this project.  The study involves reading 
several clinical case vignettes and recording clinical impressions for each vignette.  
Participation involves reading two clinical vignettes initially, and then one week later, 
signing onto our website to complete the second part of the study.  At that time you will 
read two additional vignettes and record several follow up impressions.  Participation in 
the study will take only approximately 5-10 minutes, and all responses are anonymous. 
  At the end of the study, you will have the option of viewing several points to 
consider, in the process of psychodiagnosis.  You will also have the option of viewing the 
study results at our lab website, 
(http://www.psychology.drexel.edu/anxietyresearch/pages/) once the study has been 
completed.   If you have any questions, please do not reply to this email.  Rather, please 
contact our project coordinator, Meagan Carleton, M.S., at (215) 762-3327, or by email at 
mec38@drexel.edu.  If you are willing to participate, please simply click on the link 
below to read more information about the study and to participate.  Thank you for your 
consideration.  
 
Sincerely, 
 
James Herbert, Ph.D. 
Associate Professor 
Director of Clinical Training 
Drexel University 
 
http://www.clinicalimpressionresearch.com 
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Appendix C: Page One of Data Collection Website 
www.clinicalimpressionresearch.com 
 
 
 
Clinical Impressions of Practicing Psychotherapists 
Principle Investigator: James D. Herbert, Ph.D.  
Co-Investigator: Meagan Carleton, M.S. 
Department of Psychology, 
Drexel University 
(215) 762-1692 
 
Study Purpose: The primary purpose of this study is to better understand the process of 
making clinical decisions in the mental health field. 
Study Procedures: Participation in this study will take approximately 5-10 minutes. We 
are interested in your impressions of two clinical cases, “Ms. A, and Mr. B.” You will be 
asked to read two case vignettes at two time points (today and approximately one week 
from today) and complete a short (1 page) form after reading each vignette. Please only 
participate if you are willing to take part at these two different time points. The first set of 
vignettes are linked to this form (click on “I agree to participate” at the bottom of this 
page to read the case vignettes.) You will then be asked to enter a five digit identification 
number and this will serve as your user identification number throughout the duration of 
the study. This will be the only means of identification, and therefore, all responses will 
remain confidential and anonymous. Upon reading each vignette and completing the 
short forms, simply press the “submit” button, and your responses will be submitted to a 
secure database. Immediately upon receipt of your response, James D. Herbert, Ph.D., or 
a research assistant will look up your response and will only use your selected five digit 
user identification number to identify your information. This website and our server are 
secure sites. However, if you are concerned about submitting your data via the internet, 
you may print the vignettes and the forms and mail in a paper copy. The mailing address 
is available at the end of this form. Surveys received by mail will be treated with the 
same protocol and confidentiality as surveys received via the internet. Approximately one 
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week after you complete the initial questionnaires, please log on to our website again and 
enter in your five digit identification number. Once you enter your five digit user 
identification number, you will be linked to a secure database that will give you access to 
a) the initial vignettes you read, b) your initial clinical impressions of those vignettes and, 
c) additional clinical information in the form of two additional vignettes for each 
“patient.” That is, there will be two additional vignettes that will provide additional 
information on each of your “patients.” Finally, you will be asked to complete two final 
forms asking for your clinical impressions of these vignettes.  
Risks: Despite using password protected, secure databases and servers to keep all data 
confidential and anonymous, there is always a slight possibility that data may be revealed 
through transmission over the internet.  
Confidentiality: All information obtained is strictly confidential and anonymous. Only 
the Principle Investigator (James D. Herbert, Ph.D.) and research assistants directly 
working on the project will have access to the data. All data will be kept in a locked 
cabinet at Drexel University. Electronic data will be stored on a computer in the 
Department of Psychology at Drexel University and will be password protected. All 
information will be reported in group form and will remain strictly anonymous. 
Compensation: There is no monetary remuneration for participation. However, upon 
completion of the study you will have the opportunity to view the general findings, which 
will be posted to our lab website 
(http://www.psychology.drexel.edu/anxietyresearch/pages/). In addition, immediately 
upon completion, you will have the opportunity to review several points to consider when 
forming clinical impressions.  
Contact: If you have any questions or desire further information with respect to the 
study, please contact Meagan Carleton, M.S. by phone at (215) 762-3327 or by email at 
mec38@drexel.edu. 
Agreement to participate: I am aware that I have the right to ask questions and receive 
answers to any questions related to this study. I am aware that I have the right to refuse to 
participate or may withdraw from the study at any time. I also realize that all information 
is strictly confidential. I understand that there is a possibility that despite the best efforts 
of the researchers to ensure that all data is kept completely confidential and anonymous, 
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there is a possibility that data may be revealed while being transmitted over the internet. I 
am aware that I have a second option to mail in the questionnaire if I prefer. I am aware 
that, if the forms are completed, it will be assumed that I have agreed to participate. I am 
also aware that by reading this cover page and by continuing on with the survey I am not 
waiving any of my legal rights. I understand that if I have any questions or concerns 
regarding my treatment or rights as a research participant, I may contact the Office of 
Research at Drexel University by phone at (215) 895-5849. 
Please print this page and keep for your records and reference. 
I have read and understand the contents on this form and I agree to participate.  
 
Please randomly select one, and only one, of the following Sets: A,B,C or D. It doesn't 
matter which one you select.  
• Set A  
• Set B  
• Set C  
• Set D  
 
If you're logging in to complete the second part of the study at Week Two, please Click 
here. 
 
James D. Herbert, Ph.D. or Meagan Carleton, M.S. 
Department of Psychology 
Drexel University 
245 N 15th Street, MS 988 
Philadelphia, PA 19102-1192 
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Appendix D: General Instructions Provided to Both Instructional Groups at Time 1 
 
 
 
Thank you for your interest in participating! 
 We are interested in your clinical impressions of two clinical cases, “Ms. A and 
Mr. B.” Please read the information provided in the following case vignettes. Then 
complete the attached forms inquiring about your general clinical impressions. Please 
read these vignettes and record your clinical impressions as if you were receiving this 
information during the early phase of assessment of a client. As we are interested in your 
own general clinical impressions, please do not consult with the DSM or other materials 
in making your judgments.  
Prior to beginning the study, please chose a five digit number and please make 
sure to write it down. This is the only way that we will be able to identify your data, as 
this number will serve as your user identification number. This number will also serve as 
your password when you log onto our website one week from today. 
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Appendix E: General Instructions Provided to Both Instructional Groups at Time 2 
 
Principle Investigator: James D. Herbert, Ph.D.  
Co-Investigator: Meagan Carleton, M.S. 
Department of Psychology, 
Drexel University 
(215) 762-1692 
Dear Clinicians,  
Thank you for taking a few moments to complete the clinical exercise last week. As 
mentioned in the materials that you received last week, we are interested in clinicians’ general 
clinical impressions of two clinical cases, Ms. A. and Mr. B.  
Please take a few moments to read the following case vignettes, which are an extension 
of the vignettes you read last week. That is, you can think of these new vignettes as 
information that you might gather in a follow up session from last week. After reading 
each vignette, please complete the clinical impression rating forms. If you would like to refer 
back to the first vignettes you read, you may do so. Once you click the “Submit” button below, 
you will be able to access the vignettes you read last week, as well as your initial clinical 
impressions. If you would like, please feel free to revisit these materials to refresh your memory.  
This is the final part of this exercise. Please understand that this is not a test of your 
clinical abilities. We are only interested in your general clinical impressions and, therefore, we 
ask that you do not consult with any materials such as the DSM. If you have any questions, please 
feel free to contact Meagan Carleton, M.S., project coordinator, at (215) 762-3327, or via email at 
mec38@drexel.edu. Again, thank you for your time.  
Sincerely,  
James D. Herbert, Ph.D. 
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Appendix F: Bias Sensitization Instructions 
 
 
These instructions are provided at time 2 only, and only for the bias sensitization group 
(sets B and C); based on the instructions provided by Friedlander and Phillips, 1984):  
 
Before completing the clinical exercise, please read the following information regarding 
the confirmation bias.  
Previous research has found that when people complete tasks like these, they 
often display several biases, one of which is known as the confirmation bias. That is, they 
tend to stick closely to their initial opinion even if additional evidence is inconsistent or 
even contradictory to the initial information. In sum, people often do not adjust enough 
from their initial judgments when important new information is provided. 
One example of the confirmation bias occurs when a therapist, like yourself, 
assigns a diagnosis to a client after the first session based on all information available at 
that time. At a later session, the therapist finds out some important information that 
should lead them to change the diagnosis. If the therapist is subject to the confirmation 
bias, they may not change the diagnosis. Rather, he or she may either ignore the new 
information, or even reinterpret it to fit with the initial diagnosis. This type of error has 
been found in a number of studies. 
One reason that this bias might occur is that people like to remain consistent. This 
tendency toward being consistent may keep you from revising your diagnosis. When you 
complete the next step in this study, please do everything you can to avoid this bias. To 
avoid this bias, consider whether the new information provided warrants a change from 
your previous diagnosis. When you complete the next step in this study, please make an 
attempt to avoid this bias. To avoid this bias, consider whether the new information 
provided warrants a change from your previous diagnosis. 
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Appendix G: Case Vignettes 
 
 
 
 
Schizophreniform Disorder: Part I 
Ms. A:  Session 1 
Ms. A. is a 26 year old divorced mother of two.  Her children are 2 and 4 years 
old.  She reports suffering from hallucinations and delusions for the past 12 weeks.  She 
lost her job three weeks ago soon after she called in sick to work everyday for two weeks.  
At that time, her boss called and told her that if she did not come to work, she would lose 
her job.  She returned to work the following day; however, her behaviors were notably 
bizarre. She told her co-workers that she knew that they had been scheming against her 
and were trying to get her fired.  She refused to use the phone at her desk as she was 
convinced that her boss was recording all her conversations and would relay this 
information to the FBI in an attempt to have her imprisoned.  Her co-workers soon started 
to avoid her because of her bizarre behavior.  For example, she repeated phrases that she 
had heard, including nonsense phrases.  In addition, she tried to convince another co-
worker to quit her job because “they were after her too.”  She was fired shortly thereafter 
because of her disruptive and bizarre behavior.  Shortly after she was fired, she started 
hearing voices telling her that she was going to be killed for causing other people to 
commit crimes.  She also has very low energy and feels confused a great deal of the time. 
Currently, her ex-husband is trying to gain custody of their children, as he observed her 
leaving both children in the house alone while she went out for several hours.  Ms. A. 
reports no memory of this and feels that her ex-husband is taking part in the plot to try to 
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place her in jail. She recently confided in a friend that her ex-husband and her ex-boss 
have been making videotapes of her wherever she goes and is giving them to the FBI. 
Schizophreniform Disorder: Part II 
Ms. A: Session 2 
Two days ago Ms. A.’s sister brought her to the emergency room shortly after 
they spoke over the phone.  When Mrs. A. spoke with her sister on the phone, she 
informed her about her ex-husband and her boss making videotapes of her.  Her sister 
was alarmed after hearing what Ms. A. was saying, and suggested they go to get some 
help together. 
Once in the emergency room, Ms. A. told her sister and the crisis team about her upstairs 
neighbors, on whom she has been fixated for the past 12 weeks.  She reported that during 
the time that she was home sick from work, the neighbors started harassing her.  When 
her sister probed a bit more, she reported that they had been “accessing” her thoughts and 
repeating them to her.  She reported that she was not as disturbed by people accessing her 
thoughts as she was about not being able to control the process.  She reported that she has 
been so upset by the neighbors harassing her that she has gone up to bang on their door 
and yell at them several times a day.  She reported that she has also considered hiring 
someone to “teach them a lesson,” although she is concerned for the safety of her 
neighbors’ son, who has nothing to do with the harassment. Ms. A. reported that she 
believes that most people are able to access others’ thoughts; however, she believes that 
she just recently developed this ability herself, as she was a “late bloomer.”  When asked 
about her first experience with others accessing her thoughts, she reported that she was in 
her kitchen making dinner approximately 3 months ago, and she heard the voices of 
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people in the street reciting the entire dinner menu.  When asked why she thought that 
this was a real experience and not only in her mind, she reported that when she looked 
out the window, she actually saw people in the street looking up at her as they repeated 
the menu. 
Alcohol Induced Psychotic Disorder Part II 
Ms. A: Session 2 
Ms. A. reported feeling especially distressed this past week due to the possibility 
that she may lose custody of her children.  She reported that she may go to the police to 
report her husband and his friends for videotaping her every move.  When asked about 
her history, Ms. A reported that two years ago, she began drinking alcohol to “calm her 
nerves.”  As her tolerance increased, she gradually increased her drinking from 1-2 drinks 
per day to 4-6 drinks per day.  She tried to stop drinking on two occasions and was 
successful; however, she returned to drinking on both occasions.  Whereas she has been 
drinking for the past two years, Ms. A reported a dramatic increase in her drinking that 
started approximately 12 weeks ago.   
This past month, Ms. A. went to court in an attempt to keep custody of her 
children.  The week before the custody hearing, she was extremely nervous about going 
to court and decided to try to relax using her usual routine, which included drinking 
alcohol throughout the day.  However, due to the especially stressful upcoming event, she 
drank even more than usual during the days before the court date.  She later realized that 
she should not go to court smelling as though she had been drinking, however, and she 
decided to not to drink the day before.  She entered the courtroom again feeling confused 
and started repeating phrases at random.  She then believed that she was able to control 
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the judge’s decision through her rate of breathing.  She began to breathe long slow 
breaths through her nose and believed that if she continued this throughout the entire day, 
she would leave with custody of her two children.  When she returned home after the 
hearing, she was very upset about the possibility of losing her children and started to 
drink.  She drank excessively throughout most of the next day and the next night, and 
later took her children to a hotel because she believed that her ex-husband had set up a 
video-camera in her apartment. She paid in cash for the hotel and parked at the back of 
the hotel so that her ex-husband would not be able to trace her whereabouts. 
Panic Disorder with Agoraphobia: Part I   
Mr. B: Session 1 
Mr. B. is a 23 year old unemployed accountant who has become increasingly 
incapacitated by severe physical symptoms during which he suddenly feels as though he 
may be having a heart attack.  He reports an increase in heart rate, sweating, shaking and 
nausea.  The attacks started during his mid-teens, however they have increased in 
frequency during the past three years.  When the attacks first started, he feared he might 
be dying.  However, throughout the past year he believes that he may be going crazy, as 
there is no known physical cause to the attacks.  He reports a moderate level of anxiety 
between attacks, as he fears that he may have another attack at any time.  He has become 
so preoccupied with somatic feelings that he can no longer tolerate going out in public 
unless he is accompanied by his mother.  In addition, when he has experienced these 
symptoms in public, he has felt as though he had humiliated himself and has since tried to 
avoid all public situations.  He has experienced these symptoms for the past six years, 
although he feels that his symptoms have become increasingly worse over the past year.  
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Lately, he has not left his home for over four months and will only leave in case of an 
emergency.  He recently went to his primary care physician who prescribed Ativan and 
although he has been taking it as prescribed, he continues to refuse to leave his home. 
Panic Disorder with Agoraphobia: Part II 
Mr. B: Session 2 
Mr. B is the only child of older parents, who expected to be childless in their late 
thirties when he was born.  His parents were loving and caring, although they often did 
not have the energy to take him out to play or have other children over to play.  Since that 
time, he has always felt more comfortable with adults than with peers and preferred to 
stay at home rather than go out with friends, even when he was in high-school.  When he 
was a teenager, he never told anyone about the attacks because he feared that he may 
“find out the worst.”  That is, he feared that he may be dying.  Instead, he kept the attacks 
to himself, hoping they would pass very quickly.  This was difficult to do, especially if he 
had an attack while at school or out with friends.  On the rare occasion that his friends or 
a teacher noticed that something was wrong, he would report that he was not feeling well 
and that he just needed to get some air.  The attacks always passed within ten minutes and 
he was able to return to what he was doing. Currently, Mr. B. feels as though he is 
defective and inferior and although he would like to get help from a psychologist, he is 
fearful that if he leaves his home he will have another attack.  Mr. B. reported that he has 
recently had these attacks while at home as well, especially when he is thinking of 
situations that he may encounter if he leaves his house.  This has been problematic for 
him, as he has tried to prepare himself for leaving his home by imagining a trip outside of 
his home from beginning to end.   
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Mr. B. reported that the Ativan has helped to decrease his symptoms after an 
attack starts, although he reports that he does not want to be dependent on the Ativan, 
having to carry it with him at all times. 
Social Anxiety Disorder  Part II: 
Mr. B: Session 2 
As a child, Mr. B was always shy and did not want to be left alone with 
babysitters.  During his childhood, Mr. B. developed mild school refusal and was never 
willing to try summer camp.  During adolescence, he was interested in dating, but he was 
usually too shy to initiate his own relationships with women, although at times he went 
out on dates that his mother set up for him.  Mr. B.’s symptoms have become 
increasingly worse throughout his early twenties.  On occasion, he has tried to establish 
friendships and romantic relationships.  However, each effort has ended in failure and 
humiliation because Mr. B. becomes anxious, ruminates that his is doing the wrong thing, 
and has an anxiety attack.  He then finally gives up and returns to the “family routine,” 
which he feels is safe.  In the past year he has also avoided phone calls for fear that he 
may say something wrong and have an attack while on the phone.  In addition, over the 
past year Mr. B. has started having attacks while he is at home, just thinking about social 
situations that he may encounter if he were to leave his house.  His panic attacks only 
occur when he is anticipating or is actually engaged in some kind of interpersonal 
situation.  He recognizes that he needs to start working soon, as his parents cannot 
support him forever.  However, just thinking about being evaluated during a job 
interview brings on attacks as well. 
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Appendix H: Clinical Impression Record Form 
 
 
 
Please take a few moments to complete the following:  
I. Clinical Global Impression: Severity Rating  
Clinical Rating: Please circle one 
1. Normal, not at all ill    
2. Borderline, mentally ill 
3. Mildly ill 
4. Moderately ill 
5. Markedly ill 
6. Severely ill 
7. Among the most extremely ill patients 
 
II. Diagnosis- 1st three axes (Please assign only 1 diagnosis per axis, i.e., the primary diagnosis) 
 I. ______________________ 
 II.______________________ 
  III._____________________ 
III. Medication recommendations- if any?  
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
IV. Any further recommendations (aside from individual therapy)? 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________ 
 
V. Potential obstacles to treatment (if any)?  
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
CONTINUE 
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Appendix I: Demographic Form 
 
 
 
Thank you for completing the previous exercise.  Please take a moment to 
complete the following brief demographic questionnaire. 
1.) Age:_______ 
2.) Gender:  M   F 
3.) Please list your theoretical orientation (i.e., cognitive-behavioral, psychodynamic, 
etc.) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
4.) Number of years practicing psychotherapy:_________________ 
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Appendix J: Confirmation Bias Information 
 
 
Clinical Impressions of Practicing Psychotherapists 
 
Principle Investigator: James D. Herbert, Ph.D., (215) 762-1692, jh49@drexel.edu
Co-Investigator: Meagan Carleton, M.S., (215) 762-3327, mec38@drexel.edu
 
Points to Consider In the Process of Psychodiagnosis 
 
Research has demonstrated that there are several factors to consider that may 
impact the accuracy of psychodiagnosis. Some of these include a) unsystematic 
interviewing and data collection methods, b) lack of use of a multi-modal assessment, c) 
overconfidence in one’s judgements and d) problems associated with reliance on 
memory. Some of these issues are relatively straightforward to address, such as using 
semi-structured clinical interviews to systematize data collection, using multi-modal 
assessment strategies, and taking extensive notes. However, other factors that may be 
more difficult to correct are the natural information processing heuristics that may bias 
the diagnostic process. One such bias in particular that has been shown to impact 
psychodiagnosis is the confirmation bias, which is known as the seeking or interpreting 
of evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or hypotheses. In 
other words, without necessarily being aware of it, people often search for evidence that 
confirms existing beliefs or hypotheses, while discounting disconfirming evidence. This 
bias raises obvious problems in situations in which judgment is crucial, such as 
psychodiagnosis. In order to be more certain that a hypothesis is accurate, confirming 
evidence alone does not provide the evidence needed. Even if disconfirming evidence is 
not found, of course, we cannot be certain that the hypothesis is “true.” Nevertheless, we 
can be more confident in our conclusion than if only confirming evidence is examined.  
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Not only has the confirmation bias been shown to be operative in everyday 
interactions with students (e.g., Synder, Tanke, & Berscheid, 1977), it has also been 
shown to occur when clinicians are involved in the practice of psychodiagnosis. For 
example, Temerlin (1968) found that the mere presence of a label affected the way that 
an experimental group assigned a diagnosis to their patients, suggesting that this group 
did not search for disconfirming evidence. In addition, Haverkamp, (1993) found that 
counseling trainees tested hypotheses in a confirmatory manner 64% of the time and only 
tested hypotheses in a disconfirmatory manner 15% of the time. These studies are 
consistent with a much larger body of research that suggests that unless specifically 
trained to look for disconfirming evidence, people (including clinicians) are likely to fall 
prey to the confirmation bias. 
One factor that may contribute to the apparently high frequency of the 
confirmation bias in the clinical setting is the speed with which some clinicians have been 
shown to make a diagnosis. For example, Gauron and Dickinson (1969) found that 
psychiatrists often made a diagnosis within 30 seconds of observing an interview with a 
client. This alone does not necessarily suggest a problem; however, Elstein, Shulman and 
Sprafka (1978) found that the most accurate clinicians were those who made a diagnosis 
later relative to those who made diagnostic decisions quickly. 
Some research suggests that the confirmation bias can be resisted by subjects in a 
laboratory task (Green, Flynn, & Loftus, 1982; Highhouse & Bottrill, 1995; Tweeney, 
Doherty, Worner, Pliske, Mynatt, Gross & Arkkelin, 1980). Based on this research, our 
study seeks to investigate whether clinicians evidence a confirmation bias in an analogue 
diagnostic assessment task. That is, we are interested in whether clinicians will alter their 
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diagnostic judgements based on new data, i.e., in the vignettes provided at time point 
two, when the latter provide data that could disconfirm the initial diagnosis. In addition, 
we are interested in whether explicit instructions regarding the confirmation bias will 
mitigate its effects. Finally, we are interested in whether clinicians will alter an initial 
diagnosis when they are warned about the confirmation bias even when the information 
provided does not indicate that a change in diagnosis is warranted. In other words, we are 
interested if an unnecessary correction of the diagnoses will occur after being warned 
about the confirmation bias. 
Although we do not yet know the results of the study, we would like to offer 
several suggestions to consider, based on the available literature in this area, on avoiding 
the confirmation bias in psychodiagnosis. 
The first point to consider is to make a habit of routinely looking for 
disconfirming evidence. A second point is not to make a diagnosis too quickly on the 
basis of limited data.  Refraining from making diagnostic judgments following a single 
assessment session, if possible, can increase diagnostic accuracy.  A third point is to keep 
in mind is that case conceptualizations and diagnoses should always be viewed as “works 
in progress,” subject to revision, as new information is available. A fourth point is to 
consider all of the symptoms that the client actually endorses. Arkes and Harkness (1980) 
found that even making a diagnosis can change the way that a clinician remembers 
symptoms. For example, a clinician may think that a patient, who has been assigned a 
diagnosis of a major depressive episode, actually reported particular symptoms such as 
decreased appetite or decreased energy, even when they did not do so. The clinician may 
erroneously believe that the patient endorsed these symptoms because they are consistent 
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with the diagnosis. A useful strategy for addressing this tendency is to take careful notes. 
Finally, it is unwise to believe that more experience necessarily protects against the 
confirmation bias. In fact, some research suggests that trainees are just as accurate as 
experienced clinicians (Hammond, Hursch & Todd, 1964). In addition, overconfidence 
that sometimes accompanies experience may actually lead to making these errors more 
frequently. 
Please feel free to contact the investigators if you have any questions. In addition, 
the results of the study will be posted to our website at 
http://www.psychology.drexel.edu/anxietyresearch/pages/. 
Thank you very much for your participation! 
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